# Round Report vs. H.H. Dow KC – Umich Rd 1

# 1nc

## T

#### “Economic engagement” is limited to expanding economic ties

Çelik 11 – Arda Can Çelik, Master’s Degree in Politics and International Studies from Uppsala University, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies, p. 11

Introduction

Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender stale to change the political behaviour of target stale. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway lo perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows "*It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations* ".(p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that " *the direct and positive linkage of interests of stales where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction*.

#### a. limits --- including political, military, or cultural engagement explodes the topic

Haass 00 – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Senior Fellows in the Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 5-6

Architects of engagement strategies have a wide variety of incentives from which to choose. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans, and economic aid.’2 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global economic arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market.’

Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, or the scheduling of summits between leaders—or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of International Military Educational Training (IMET) both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign mffitary officers.’4 These areas of engagement are likely to involve, working with state institutions, while cultural or civil society engagement is likely to entail building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organizations, facilitating the flow of remittances, establishing postal and telephone links between the United States and the target country, and promoting the exchange of students, tourists, and other nongovernmental people between the countries are some of the incentives that might be offered under a policy of cultural engagement.

This brief overview of the various forms of engagement illuminates the choices open to policymakers. The plethora of options signals the flexibility of engagement as a foreign policy strategy and, in doing so, reveals one of the real strengths of engagement. At the same time, it also suggests the urgent need for considered analysis of this strategy. The purpose of this book is to address this need by deriving insights and lessons from past episodes of engagement and proposing guidelines for the future use of engagement strategies. Throughout the book, two critical questions are entertained. First, when should policymakers consider engagement? A strategy of engagement may serve certain foreign policy objectives better than others. Specific characteristics of a target country may make it more receptive to a strategy of engagement and the incentives offered under it; in other cases, a country's domestic politics may effectively exclude the use of engagement strategies. Second, how should engagement strategies be managed to maximize the chances of success? Shedding light on how policymakers achieved, or failed, in these efforts in the past is critical in an evaluation of engagement strategies. By focusing our analysis, these questions and concerns help produce a framework to guide the use of engagement strategies in the upcoming decades.

### 1NC Ptx—CIR

#### Immigration reform will pass now – but obama’s political capital is necessary to get moderates on board

Connor Higgins, political columnist, M.A. in US History from George Mason University, 10/28 [“GOP civil war: Obama and immigration,” http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/its-all-smoke-and-whiskey/2013/oct/28/gop-civil-war-obama-and-immigration/]

WASHINGTON, October 28, 2013 — Divide and conquer: that is what President Obama has in planned for his opponents in Washington. First he will divide them, squabble with one another, fight one another. Either in time or by his own doing, he will relegate the Republican party to the history books.¶ How, one might ask? What is the President doing that is causing so much stir and bad blood among the GOP?¶ President Obama is a brilliant politician, and what he lacks in actual substantial leadership he makes up for in his unflappable ability to spin any situation, no matter how disastrous, just as he wants it to be spun. Using this ability, he has waged an unceasing war on the Republican party and all things on the right of the political spectrum.¶ It is as if the President is a general, and he is leading his forces against the forces of his adversaries, the Republican party. On his side is the majority of major news outlets, billions of dollars in campaign and advertising funds, Hollywood, and Unions. On his side is also the perception that anything he does is the right thing to do for the country, he has everyone eating out of the palm of his hands, and doing exactly what he wants them to do.¶ On one front there is Obamacare, which has seen fighting since it was passed early in his tenure as President. That is dirty, slugging, bloody political trench warfare that has seen the Democrats and the President advance steadily towards the Republican line. Key victories were when the law was upheld at the Supreme Court level, and most recently when the Republicans were defeated over the shutdown. However, with the roll out of Healthcare.gov the Democrats and President Obama have suffered setbacks and many have lost face. The website cost over half a billion dollars and does not work properly, this amounts to a hole in their line which the Republicans are now trying to exploit for further political gain. However the President is prepared for that.¶ Instead of reinforcing his line on Obamacare, he has reopened a familiar front and attacked the Republicans on Immigration. Now, Republican resources will have to be pulled from the fight against Obamacare to hold the line on the immigration fight. In the meantime, President Obama is fighting a political guerrilla campaign against the issues of Benghazi, NSA, Journalist tapping, and the IRS scandal by simply running or sidestepping any attempt at being drawn out into an open fight. What is more, he masterfully uses the media and his political allies to hammer the Republicans for pursuing these issues. He makes the Republicans look petty, and most of the time he does not even involve himself in the fight to begin with. It is a win win for him.¶ The President got it right with Obamacare, no not in the sense that he was right to federalize the healthcare system in this country, but in the sense of what it gained him politically. By passing Obamacare when the Democrats controlled the House and the Senate it offered him a unique opportunity on so many fronts. In one way, the bill could potentially bring millions of more people under the direct care and charge of the federal government. It would grow the voter base, it would allow for the government to intercede further in the lives of citizens, and it was one step closer to a single payer system, which is the dream of every socialist in the country.¶ However, one of the main political victories the ACA scored was that it provided Republicans with a fixed point to set their sights on. Obamacare provided the Republicans with the objective of trying to repeal one of the largest expansions of federal government power since the DHS and the Patriot Act. The legislation that would basically make President Obama care taker n’ chief would drive many national elections, garner millions of dollars to see it repealed, and be the sole issue that many Republicans deal with on a daily basis. And all of that, makes Obamacare a win win for President Obama whether or not the bill stands or is repealed.¶ While Republicans were busy throwing everything they had at Obamacare, Democrats opened up fronts on gun control, spending, same sex marriage, ‘don’t ask don’t tell’, taxing the rich, billions of dollars to failed energy projects, drastically increasing the power and scope of the NSA surveillance programs, targeting conservatives through the IRS, and as mentioned before suppressing journalists who do not side with him. This does not mean, or suggest, that these issues were not encountered or addressed, it is suggesting that with so much effort and so much support thrown behind defeating Obamacare, there is far less effort and far less support available to counter the abovementioned issues. With every Republican slamming Obamacare, the liberal media, as well as the President and his allies, spin it as an old white racist who does not want to help anyone. And when the old white racists attempt to address an issue such as Benghazi, or the NSA, they are accused of attempting to distract Americans from the more pressing issues of the day.¶ The most recent government shutdown saw a major, blistering defeat for the Republicans. Members of their own party gave up the fight, or saw it was not worth dying on a hill for, so they retreated in the face of what they perceived to be overwhelming odds. In a double stroke of luck for President Obama and the Democrats, the Republican party has begun to stratify and turn on one another. They are fighting themselves, and while civil war wages within the GOP the President has seized his opportunity and pushed for lawmakers to once again take up immigration issues.¶ President Obama, as said before, has reopened an old front. He has reopened an old front at a time when those who should be addressing that front on behalf of the GOP are fighting one another. The Tea Party factions will resist most or any immigration issues that deal with amnesty, but the Establishment will more than likely be willing to work with the other side of the aisle in an effort to be able to say that they worked with the other side of the aisle. With the GOP house divided, President Obama could have greater success in achieving his immigration goals while further dividing his rivals. The Tea Party even came to power in opposition to legislation such as Obamacare, but the division among the GOP has afforded the President to turn the establishment GOP on the upstart “radical” conservatives. All the while, the GOP will be distracted from confronting the President on the problems with Obamacare, and they will instead be forced to spend assets to deal with immigration reform, which is a key issue for both sides in Washington.¶ President Obama is threatening to overwhelm the GOP. With faction in-fighting, inferior numbers in Washington, and against a more than capable opponent, the Republicans will have to find a way to reconcile their differences and stand united. If the Establishment and the Tea Party Republicans do not realize that they cannot fight effectively if they are divided they will fall victim to the Obama political machine and cease to be a viable option for conservatives who wish to see the rapid expansion of government size and power curtailed in Washington.

#### Immigration reform necessary to sustain the economy and competitiveness

Javier Palomarez, Forbes, 3/6/13, The Pent Up Entrepreneurship That Immigration Reform Would Unleash, www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/03/06/the-pent-up-entrepreneurship-that-immigration-reform-would-unleash/print/

The main difference between now and 2007 is that today the role of immigrants and their many contributions to the American economy have been central in the country’s national conversation on the issue. Never before have Latinos been so central to the election of a U.S. President as in 2012. New evidence about the economic importance of immigration reform, coupled with the new political realities presented by the election, have given reform a higher likelihood of passing. As the President & CEO of the country’s largest Hispanic business association, the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (USHCC), which advocates for the interests of over 3 million Hispanic owned businesses, I have noticed that nearly every meeting I hold with corporate leaders now involves a discussion of how and when immigration reform will pass. The USHCC has long seen comprehensive immigration reform as an economic imperative, and now the wider business community seems to be sharing our approach. It is no longer a question of whether it will pass. Out of countless conversations with business leaders in virtually every sector and every state, a consensus has emerged: our broken and outdated immigration system hinders our economy’s growth and puts America’s global leadership in jeopardy. Innovation drives the American economy, and without good ideas and skilled workers, our country won’t be able to transform industries or to lead world markets as effectively as it has done for decades. Consider some figures: Immigrant-owned firms generate an estimated $775 billion in annual revenue, $125 billion in payroll and about $100 billion in income. A study conducted by the New American Economy found that over 40 percent of Fortune 500 companies were started by immigrants or children of immigrants. Leading brands, like Google, Kohls, eBay, Pfizer, and AT&T, were founded by immigrants. Researchers at the Kauffman Foundation released a study late last year showing that from 2006 to 2012, one in four engineering and technology companies started in the U.S. had at least one foreign-born founder — in Silicon Valley it was almost half of new companies. There are an estimated 11 million undocumented workers currently in the U.S. Imagine what small business growth in the U.S. would look like if they were provided legal status, if they had an opportunity for citizenship. Without fear of deportation or prosecution, imagine the pent up entrepreneurship that could be unleashed. After all, these are people who are clearly entrepreneurial in spirit to have come here and risk all in the first place. Immigrants are twice as likely to start businesses as native-born Americans, and statistics show that most job growth comes from small businesses. While immigrants are both critically-important consumers and producers, they boost the economic well-being of native-born Americans as well. Scholars at the Brookings Institution recently described the relationship of these two groups of workers as complementary. This is because lower-skilled immigrants largely take farming and other manual, low-paid jobs that native-born workers don’t usually want. For example, when Alabama passed HB 56, an immigration law in 2012 aimed at forcing self-deportation, the state lost roughly $11 billion in economic productivity as crops were left to wither and jobs were lost. Immigration reform would also address another important angle in the debate – the need to entice high-skilled immigrants. Higher-skilled immigrants provide talent that high-tech companies often cannot locate domestically. High-tech leaders recently organized a nationwide “virtual march for immigration reform” to pressure policymakers to remove barriers that prevent them from recruiting the workers they need. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, fixing immigration makes sound fiscal sense. Economist Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda calculated in 2010 that comprehensive immigration reform would add $1.5 trillion to the country’s GDP over 10 years and add $66 billion in tax revenue – enough to fully fund the Small Business Administration and the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce for over two years. As Congress continues to wring its hands and debate the issue, lawmakers must understand what both businesses and workers already know: The American economy needs comprehensive immigration reform.

#### Extinction

**Auslin 9**

(Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and **global chaos** followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would **dramatically raise tensions** inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in **all regions of the globe** and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce **into a big bang**.

### 1NC Security Kritik

#### Security driven economic engagement with Latin America authorizes international violence while criminalizing dissent – the 1AC exhibits a discourse of security that provides the rationale for global domination.

Figueredo 7 [Darío Salinas, Professor in the Graduate Program in Social Sciences at the Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City, specialist in Latin American Studies at the CONACYT National System of Researchers, Latin American Perspectives, Issue 152, Vol. 34 No. 1, January, “Hegemony in the Coordinates of U.S. Policy: Implications for Latin America,” Translated by Marlene Medrano, p. 95-98]

The mobilization of an external threat, real or fictitious, and the belief in its intrinsic superiority have historically been important aspects of the discourse of U.S. policy, from the notion of the “savage” Native Americans to the Monroe Doctrine and the postulates of Manifest Destiny to the Huntingtonian elaboration that, by stressing cultural differences, suggests the capacity to harbor in its historical mission the germ of a “superior culture.”¶ After 1989, U.S. hegemony, in its search for a redefinition of the enemy, found in terrorism the threat it required to further its policy. The construction of this threat has not been free of inaccuracies and exaggerations. The most blatant example is that of the “weapons of mass destruction” supposedly in the hands of the deposed Baghdad regime, which, according to Washington, represented a real threat to U.S. security but which turned out to exist only in the political laboratory of the presidential team.¶ The new geostrategic order is overwhelmingly unilateral from the point of view of the political-military, financial, and technological power of the United States. The emergent polarities are fragmented and barely sketch a relative economic and commercial hierarchy, especially with regard to China, Japan, and Germany. At the same time, various indicators suggest a decline in the U.S. economy. The dynamic of these changes has important consequences for the conceptualization of the security issue.¶ During the cold war, “security” meant the traditional “state security.” It consisted of the perception of threats superimposed on the identification of internal conflicts that were treated as “subversive threats” supported from outside. Schematically, this was the general logic of the hegemonic notion of security that involved the “containment of communism” as an ideology. A political framework referred to as “national security doctrine” served as a model for the conduct of the majority of Latin American governments. The hypothesis of “civil war,” which gave rise to the “fight against subversion,” justified the installation or survival of dictatorships.¶ Recently, others attempting to identify structural causes for the conflicts that threaten security have revised this conceptualization. The context for this redefinition is globalization and its implication of interdependence. It is in this context that we can situate terrorism as a “global threat” articulated as a component of a security policy.¶ Finally, the transition to democracy has not resulted in a substantial restructuring of the armed forces. Despite the beneficent dimensions of the political changes in terms of human rights and a democratic rearrangement of the civil-military relationship (Tulchin, 2002), there is no indication of a significant change in the doctrinal framework that guided the actions of the armed forces up to the 1980s. Although there is no homogeneity within military institutions, a conceptual and doctrinal framework is maintained as a general rule. This is an advantage for the new security strategy connected with the fight against terrorism, given that its conception continues to be part of its capacity to control the conduct of others—in other words, to orchestrate its hegemony.¶ FREE TRADE AND SECURITY¶ The post–cold-war period has been characterized by the indisputable dominance of financial capital in the development of the global economy. The free circulation of unrestricted capital constitutes the motor of the model. The globalization of markets involves privatization and deregulation of the international financial system on a primarily speculative basis. The movement of international capital has been freed from the variables of the economy whose operation remained largely beyond the control of the national authorities in charge of economic policy, variables that Treasury secretaries often refer to in terms of a “difficult environment.” The proposal to transform the Latin American region into a free-trade zone is a reflection of this climate that, since 1989 and especially since the Washington Consensus, has been deployed as the ideology of neoliberalism and then as a policy converted into action (Cademartori, 2004).¶ In fact, U.S. conceptions of security and economic-commercial policy constitute an integrated geostrategic whole; the expansion of global commerce is part of the security strategy of the United States (Salinas, 2002). The project is aimed at standardizing the development of the world in terms of criteria that favor the economic-political configuration of the principal world power (Chossudovsky, 2002). Proposals of integration are not related exclusively to commercial issues. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which should not be considered abandoned, and other free-trade treaties should be considered geopolitical mechanisms for developing a large-scale project of domination. These mechanisms range from the strictly economic to those concerning labor legislation, state reform, laws concerning intellectual property, the environment, natural and energy resources, knowledge, and culture. The free-trade treaties signed so far, Chile’s among them, endorse the totalizing character intended by Washington and Wall Street (Weintraub and Prado, 2005).¶ It is exactly from this angle that the core of this geostrategic conception can be appraised. Its most acute expression was in the formulation of the concept of the “preventive war,” which in the case of Iraq was carried out at the margins of international legality, confirming the unilateralism that is fundamental to decision making in the new geostrategic order.¶ Antiterrorist policy operates as a coercive force that has an impact on regimes whose margins of self-determination are most precarious. The comprehensive treatment of these challenges is expressed in the context of the fragmentation of Latin American foreign policy in the face of the pragmatic U.S. prioritization of drug trafficking, terrorism, and migration.¶ Since 9/11 the United States has attempted to implement its national security policy without much concern for the establishment of agreements. This course of action was ratified both in the Conference on Hemispheric Security in 2003 and in the meeting of secretaries of defense in 2004. Lack of concordance in the treatment of an agenda shared with the United States necessarily turns into a sounding board for a social and political imbalance that disturbs more than the surface of diplomacy. This may be responsible for the strong social pressure to reconsider military spending in the countries of Latin America given their serious deficiencies with regard to social welfare, stability, and security. In the face of this deficit, the significance of military spending as a percentage of the global product since 2001 cannot be overlooked (IISS, 2004).¶ For Latin America, a security setting excluding the United States would be unthinkable. It is appropriate, then, to identify some complications associated with this problem.¶ 1. If the principle of dissuasion no longer seems useful in the struggle against terrorism, it is clear that, despite the prioritization of military force, a policy of alliance is required. In this sense, Latin America is an essential area for the United States because of the importance of its “great southern border.” The historical influence of the United States in the area, beyond its actual strategic supremacy and the agreements already subscribed to, is the best breeding ground for a campaign in favor of validation of the concept of security embodied in the policy of “preventive war.” The demand for collaboration stems from its imperative character, which does not admit different views because those who are not friends are enemies.¶ 2. Multilateralism has lost its force, and its political-diplomatic tools have been debilitated. Although there is no concerted regional capacity to avoid the imposition of unilateralism, countertrends and doubts are arising that release new forms of interaction and collaboration, primarily in the Andes and South America (Rojas, 2003).¶ 3. The sovereignty of the other loses its legitimacy if there is a presumption in the North that under its protection terrorism is being covered up or supported or if there is suspicion concerning the construction of weapons of mass destruction. From this perspective, one of the principal dangers for the security of Latin America stems not from foreign armies or from guerrillas but from criminal organizations. The danger of this perspective is the possibility of criminalizing the social struggle that has been unleashed in the region.¶ 4. The limits of the policy have opened a space for the absolutization of “hard power”—in other words, military force—in the new model and the antiterrorist struggle. From a Latin American viewpoint, security requires a multidimensional reading that transcends the view entailed by that struggle.¶ The significance for U.S. policy assumed by the struggle against terrorism as a “war of global reach” or a “global enterprise of uncertain duration” is inseparable from the previous points (NSC, 2002). These statements are translated into the identification of threats or zones of threat in Latin America as follows:¶ 1. The “triple border” of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, which has long been a path for unregulated trade on a grand scale—in other words, for contraband of all types. Similar cases include the Tabatinga-Leticia corridor on the Brazilian border with Colombia, the Lake Agrio zone between Ecuador and Colombia, and the Darien Jungle.¶ 2. The current government of Venezuela, because of its alleged support of the Colombian guerrillas and for setting a bad political example for the region as a whole. Its economic and political initiatives potentially constitute expressions of a counter-balance to hegemonic politics, which may explain the intrusive and destabilizing harassment to which it is subject.¶ 3. The Cuban government, for its alleged support of international terrorism and the meaning of its politics.¶ 4. “Latin American terrorist organizations,” among them the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army in addition to drug traffickers and paramilitaries. This point implicates Colombia and its neighboring countries, along with the Caribbean basin, as an extraordinarily significant area for U.S. security policy. The U.S. resources destined for Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative and a sordid struggle for the drug market, added to the climate of war and violence, reflect a situation with the capacity to produce dynamics that unbalance the strategic perspective of regional stability.

#### Security politics authorizes limitless global destruction.

Der Derian 98 (James, Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts, On Security, Ed. Lipschutz, p. 24-25)

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... [7](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0=www.ciaonet.org:80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note7) In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " [8](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0=www.ciaonet.org:80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note8) By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.

#### Reject the Aff’s security discourse – abandoning the attempt to eradicate insecurity is a prerequisite to meaningful political engagement.

Neocleous 8 [Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University, Critique of Security, p. 185-186]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security.¶ This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told – never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives.¶ Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths.¶ For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143

### 1NC Shunning

#### Mexico is a flagrant violator of human rights.

HRW 13 — Human Rights Watch, 2013 (“Mexico,” 2013 World Report, Available Online at http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/mexico?page=1, Accessed 07-22-2013)

Mexican security forces have committed widespread human rights violations in efforts to combat powerful organized crime groups, including killings, disappearances, and torture. Almost none of these abuses are adequately investigated, exacerbating a climate of violence and impunity in many parts of the country.

In an historic decision in August 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that the use of military jurisdiction to prosecute a human rights violation was unconstitutional. Nonetheless, most abuses by military personnel continue to be prosecuted in military courts, which lack independence and impartiality.

Criminal groups and members of security forces continue to threaten or attack human rights defenders and journalists. The government has failed to provide these vulnerable groups with adequate protection or investigate the crimes committed against them. In April, Mexico passed legislation to create a protection mechanism for human rights defenders and journalists, but protocols to evaluate risk and assign protection are still being designed.

#### Reject engagement with human rights abusers — *moral duty* to shun.

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict.

But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions?

We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order.

Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in.

Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order.

An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this?

First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.)

Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force."

Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it.

Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing.

We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful, persistent, and flagrant immorality.

## Case

## Relations Adv.

#### Collapse inevitable – current rate can’t maintain gdp and is causing severe climate change – freeing ourselves from the myth of economic growth allows a mindset shift that creates value to life

**Gardner, 13 –** (Dave Gardner, director of the documentary, *Growthbusters: Hooked on Growth*, and founding contributor to [www.growthbiasbusted.org](http://www.growthbiasbusted.org). August 20, 2013. “Planetary Overload: Faked Out by the Holy Grail of Economic Growth,” http://nationbuilders.thenation.com/profiles/blogs/planetary-overload-faked-out-by-the-holy-grail-of-economic-growth)//SDL

Today (August 20) is Earth Overshoot Day, according to scientists at Global Footprint Network. That means in about eight months we've consumed the renewable resources the Earth takes a year to replenish. If we want to live sustainably and leave our children a world worth inheriting, we need to turn off the lights, stop eating, drinking, driving, flying, and shopping - and hold our breath for the rest of the year - to make up for our unsustainable rate of resource use.¶ WWF's Living Planet Report tells us we're using 50% more resources each year than the Earth can replenish. That's why we're seeing climate disruption, fisheries collapsing, aquifer and river levels dropping, fertile soil declining and deserts expanding. In the U.S. we're actually using resources at five times the sustainable rate. Overshoot Day for the U.S. was back in March!¶ How did we get here? Our use of resources is determined by the size of our economy and our population. Forty years ago, a group of MIT scientists ran computer models that revealed we should change course in order to live within our means on planet Earth. We ignored those models and allowed our global population and economy to cross into unsustainable territory. The primary reason: our quest for the Holy Grail of economic growth. We didn't just allow overshoot to happen; we have pursued it. ¶ This quest for perpetual economic growth has also been driving nations, regions and cities to pursue population growth (more workers and more consumers make for a bigger economy). Today we have over 7 billion people - either living materially affluent lifestyles or aspiring to do so. We have a $74 trillion global economy. Just maintaining current GDP requires extraction of raw materials from the planet at unsustainable rates. Constantly growing GDP accelerates the liquidation of natural resources.¶ So strong is our conviction that economic growth is a universal, unalloyed good, we've been happy to sacrifice the integrity of our life support systems to keep it up. If we were living on a spaceship, this would be comparable to dismantling and devouring the craft in order to feed our voracious appetite for more. Everlasting economic growth should come with a warning: Don't Try This at Home!¶ Our obsession with economic growth is based on the myth that it improves our lives. That myth was born when we confused cause with effect. During the 19th and 20th centuries we made great strides in reducing mortality and making life more convenient. Few would argue electricity, indoor plumbing, the internal combustion engine, flight, telecommunications and computers haven't worked wonders. Our mistake has been assuming the economic growth that occurred during this time period is responsible for these technological achievements.¶ Thomas Edison didn't say one day, "Ah, GDP growth is 3%; that gives me an idea for generating electricity!" Economic growth was a byproduct of widespread adoption of these achievements. It was accelerated by harnessing the power of fossil fuels and gaining access to previously untapped continents of resources. Over time, we conflated growth with progress. We believe we must have economic growth, and we've built a system that depends on it. If we don't spend enough at the mall, if we don't buy enough cars or build more and more houses, our economy collapses.¶ Equating progress with GDP growth, however, is like equating a rise in automobile exhaust with increasing mobility. Mobility is desirable, but if we gauge it by measuring exhaust, we are not likely to focus on healthy, sustainable ways to improve mobility. Good lives with needs met are good, but when we gauge them by measuring economic throughput, we get off track and focus on the wrong things. We should be finding ways to improve our lives that don't require us to dismantle our spaceship.¶ The good news is the very things that really count in life, that bring fulfillment, happiness and a sense of purpose, don't require the creation and consumption of more stuff. Abandoning our quest for the Holy Grail of economic growth will free us to step off the treadmill and spend our time doing what matters - what Mike Nickerson describes in Life, Money & Illusion as "the three L's:" loving, learning, and laughing. Here's the announcement from Global Footprint Network. Here's a brief video about overshoot from the Global Footprint Network.

**Best scientific models show economic decline is key to solving anthropogenic run-away warming that will cause total extinction**

**Li 10** – (Dr. Ming Li, Assistant Professor Department of Economics, University of Utah. 2010. “The 21st Century Crisis: Climate Catastrophe or Socialism”, Paper prepared for the David Gordon Memorial Lecture at URPE Summer Conference)//SDL

The global average surface temperature is now about 0.8C (0.8 degree Celsius) higher than the pre-industrial time. Under the current trend, the world is on track towards a long-term warming between 4C and 8C. At this level of global warming, the world would be in an extreme greenhouse state not seen for almost 100 million years, devastating human civilization and destroying nearly all forms of life on the present earth (Conner and McCarthy 2009).¶ The scientific community has reached the consensus that the current global warming results from the excessive accumulation in the atmosphere of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (such as methane and nitrous oxide) emitted by human economic activities.[[1]](#footnote-1) The capitalist historical epoch has been characterized by the explosive growth of material production and consumption. The massive expansion of the world economy has been powered by fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas). Since 1820, the world economy has expanded by about seventy times and the world emissions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuels burning have increased by about sixty times (see Figure 1).¶ At the United Nations conference on climate change concluded at Copenhagen in December 2009, the world’s governments officially committed to the objective of limiting global warming to no more than 2C. However, according to the “Climate Action Tracker”, despite the official statement, the national governments’ current pledges regarding emission reduction in fact imply a warming of at least 3C by the end of the 21st century with more warming to come in the following centuries (Climate Action Tracker 2010).¶ In reality, all the major national governments are committed to infinite economic growth and none of them is willing to consider any emission reduction policy that could undermine economic growth. This is not simply because of intellectual ignorance or lack of political will. The pursuit of endless accumulation of capital (and infinite economic growth) is derived from the basic laws of motion of the capitalist economic system. Without fundamental social transformation, human civilization is now on the path to self-destruction. The next section (Section 2) reviews the basic scientific facts concerning the climate change crisis. Without an end of economic growth, it is virtually impossible for meaningful climate stabilization to be achieved (Section 3). However, both capitalist enterprises and states are constantly driven to expand production and consumption. The system of nation states effectively rules out a meaningful global political solution to the climate change crisis (Section 4). The climate change crisis is but one of several long-term historical trends that are now leading to the structural crisis of capitalism (Section 5). The resolution of the crisis and the survival of the humanity require the building of a fundamentally different social system that is based on social ownership of the means of production and society-wide planning (Section 6).

#### Even massive economic decline has zero chance of war

Jervis 11 – (Robert Jervis, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. December 2011. “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425)

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

#### Growth makes war inevitable

**Trainer 2**—Senior Lecturer of School of Social Work @ University of New South Wales (Ted, If You Want Affluence, Prepare for War, Democracy & Nature, Vol. 8, No. 2,)

If this limits-to-growth analysis is at all valid, the implications for the problem of global peace and conflict and security are clear and savage. If we all remain determined to increase our living standards, our level of production and consumption, in a world where resources are already scarce, where only a few have affluent living standards but another 8 billion will be wanting them too, and which we, the rich, are determined to get richer without any limit, then nothing is more guaranteed than that there will be increasing levels of conflict and violence. To put it another way, if we insist on remaining affluent we will need to remain heavily armed. Increased conflict in at least the following categories can be expected. First, the present conflict over resources between the rich elites and the poor majority in the Third World must increase, for example, as ‘development’ under globalisation takes more land, water and forests into export markets. Second, there are conflicts between the Third World and the rich world, the major recent examples being the war between the US and Iraq over control of oil. Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US intervened, accompanied by much high-sounding rhetoric (having found nothing unacceptable about Israel’s invasions of Lebanon or the Indonesian invasion of East Timor). As has often been noted, had Kuwait been one of the world’s leading exporters of broccoli, rather than oil, it is doubtful whether the US would have been so eager to come to its defence. At the time of writing, the US is at war in Central Asia over ‘terrorism’. Few would doubt that a ‘collateral’ outcome will be the establishment of regimes that will give the West access to the oil wealth of Central Asia. Following are some references to the connection many have recognised between rich world affluence and conflict. General M.D. Taylor, US Army retired argued ‘... US military priorities just be shifted towards insuring a steady flow of resources from the Third World’. Taylor referred to ‘… fierce competition among industrial powers for the same raw materials markets sought by the United States’ and ‘… growing hostility displayed by have-not nations towards their affluent counterparts’.62 ‘Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product; within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets’.63 ‘That more than half of the people on this planet are poorly nourished while a small percentage live in historically unparalleled luxury is a sure recipe for continued and even escalating international conflict.’64 The oil embargo placed on the US by OPEC in the early 1970s prompted the US to make it clear that it was prepared to go to war in order to secure supplies. ‘President Carter last week issued a clear warning that any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf would lead to war.’ It would ‘… be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States’.65 ‘The US is ready to take military action if Russia threatens vital American interests in the Persian Gulf, the US Secretary of Defence, Mr Brown, said yesterday.’66 Klare’s recent book Resource Wars discusses this theme in detail, stressing the coming significance of water as a source of international conflict. ‘Global demand for many key materials is growing at an unsustainable rate. … the incidence of conflict over vital materials is sure to grow. … The wars of the future will largely be fought over the possession and control of vital economic goods. … resource wars will become, in the years ahead, the most distinctive feature of the global security environment.’67 Much of the rich world’s participation in the conflicts taking place throughout the world is driven by the determination to back a faction that will then look favourably on Western interests. In a report entitled, ‘The rich prize that is Shaba’, Breeze begins, ‘Increasing rivalry over a share-out between France and Belgium of the mineral riches of Shaba Province lies behind the joint Franco– Belgian paratroop airlift to Zaire. … These mineral riches make the province a valuable prize and help explain the West’s extended diplomatic courtship …’68 Then there is potential conflict between the rich nations who are after all the ones most dependent on securing large quantities of resources. ‘The resource and energy intensive modes of production employed in nearly all industries necessitate continuing armed coercion and competition to secure raw materials.’69 ‘Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product, within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets …’70 Growth, competition, expansion … and war Finally, at the most abstract level, the struggle for greater wealth and power is central in the literature on the causes of war. ‘… warfare appears as a normal and periodic form of competition within the capitalist world economy. … world wars regularly occur during a period of economic expansion. ’71 ‘War is an inevitable result of the struggle between economies for expansion.’72 Choucri and North say their most important finding is that domestic growth is a strong determinant of national expansion and that this results in competition between nations and war.73 The First and Second World Wars can be seen as being largely about imperial grabbing. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their territory and resource access. Britain already held much of the world within its empire … which it had previously fought 72 wars to take! ‘Finite resources in a world of expanding populations and increasing per capita demands create a situation ripe for international violence.’74 Ashley focuses on the significance of the quest for economic growth. ‘War is mainly explicable in terms of differential growth in a world of scarce and unevenly distributed resources … expansion is a prime source of conflict. So long as the dynamics of differential growth remain unmanaged, it is probable that these long term processes will sooner or later carry major powers into war.’75 Security The point being made can be put in terms of security. One way to seek security is to develop greater capacity to repel attack. In the case of nations this means large expenditure of money, resources and effort on military preparedness. However there is a much better strategy; i.e. to live in ways that do not oblige you to take more than your fair share and therefore that do not give anyone any motive to attack you. Tut! This is not possible unless there is global economic justice. If a few insist on levels of affluence, industrialisation and economic growth that are totally impossible for all to achieve, and which could not be possible if they were taking only their fair share of global resources, then they must remain heavily armed and their security will require readiness to use their arms to defend their unjust privileges. In other words, if we want affluence we must prepare for war. If we insist on continuing to take most of the oil and other resources while many suffer intense deprivation because they cannot get access to them then we must be prepared to maintain the aircraft carriers and rapid deployment forces, and the despotic regimes, without which we cannot secure the oil fields and plantations. Global peace is not possible without global justice, and that is not possible unless rich countries move to ‘The Simpler Way’.

#### Reject the aff’s coercive politics—displaces voluntary efforts

**Younkins 2k** (Dr. Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business Administration at Wheeling Jesuit University in West Virginia, “Civil Society: The Realm of Freedom,” No 63, 6-10-2000, http://www.quebecoislibre.org/000610-11.htm,)

¶ Recently (and ironically), government projects and programs have been started to restore civil society through state subsidization or coercive mandates. Such coercion cannot create true voluntary associations. Statists who support such projects believe only in the power of political society – they don't realize that the subsidized or mandated activity can be performed voluntarily through the private interaction of individuals and associations. They also don't understand that to propose that an activity not be performed coercively, is not to oppose the activity, but simply its coercion. ¶ If civil society is to be revived, we must substitute voluntary cooperation for coercion and replace mandates with the rule of law. According to the Cato Handbook for Congress, Congress should: ¶ before trying to institute a government program to solve a problem, investigate whether there is some other government program that is causing the problem ... and, if such a program is identified, begin to reform or eliminate it; ¶ ask by what legal authority in the Constitution Congress undertakes an action ...; ¶ recognize that when government undertakes a program, it displaces the voluntary efforts of others and makes voluntary association in civil society appear redundant, with significant negative effects; and ¶ begin systematically to abolish or phase out those government programs that do what could be accomplished by voluntary associations in civil society ... recognizing that accomplishment through free association is morally superior to coercive mandates, and almost always generates more efficient outcomes. ¶ Every time taxes are raised, another regulation is passed, or another government program is adopted, we are acknowledging the inability of individuals to govern themselves. It follows that there is a moral imperative for us to reclaim our right to live in a civil society, rather than to have bureaucrats and politicians « solve » our problems and run our lives.

#### Trade does not solve war—there’s no correlation between trade and peace

MARTIN et al ‘8 (Phillipe, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, and Centre for Economic Policy Research; Thierry MAYER, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, CEPII, and Centre for Economic Policy Research, Mathias THOENIG, University of Geneva and Paris School of Economics, The Review of Economic Studies 75)

Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science argues that increasing trade flows and the spread of free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can partly be traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: The main objective of the European trade integration process was to prevent the killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again.1 Figure 1 suggests2 however, that during the 1870–2001 period, the correlation between trade openness and military conflicts is not a clear cut one. The first era of globalization, at the end of the 19th century, was a period of rising trade openness and multiple military conflicts, culminating with World War I. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly, while the number of conflicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). There is no clear evidence that the 1990s, during which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower prevalence of military conflicts, even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.

#### Interdependence causes war and protectionism solves this

Friedman and Friedman, ’96 [George and Meredith, Founder and Chairman of Stratfor, *The Future of War*, p. 7-9]

The argument that interdependence gives rise to peace is flawed in theory as well as in practice. Conflicts arise from friction, particularly friction involving the fundamental interests of different nations. The less interdependence there is, the fewer the areas of serious friction. The more interdependence there is, the greater the areas of friction, and, therefore, the greater the potential for conflict. Two widely separated nations that trade little with each other are unlikely to go to war—Brazil is unlikely to fight Madagascar precisely because they have so little to do with each other. France and Germany, on the other hand, which have engaged in extensive trade and transnational finance, have fought three wars with each other over about seventy years. Interdependence was the root of the conflicts, not the deterrent. There are, of course, cases of interdependence in which one country effectively absorbs the other or in which their interests match so precisely that the two countries simply merge. In other cases, interdependence remains peaceful because the economic, military, and political power of one country is overwhelming and inevitable. In relations between advanced industrialized countries and third-world countries, for example, this sort of asymmetrical relationship can frequently be seen. All such relationships have a quality of unease built into them, particularly when the level of interdependence is great. When one or both nations attempt, intentionally or unintentionally, to shift the balance of power, the result is often tremendous anxiety and, sometimes, real pain. Each side sees the other’s actions as an attempt to gain advantage and becomes frightened. In the end, precisely because the level of interdependence is so great, the relationship can, and frequently does, spiral out of control. Consider the seemingly miraculous ability of the United States and Soviet Union to be rivals and yet avoid open warfare. These two powers could forgo extreme measures because they were not interdependent. Neither relied on the other for its economic well-being, and therefore, its social stability. This provided considerable room for maneuvering. Because there were few economic linkages, neither nation felt irresistible pressure to bring the relationship under control; neither felt any time constraint. Had one country been dependent on the other for something as important as oil or long-term investment, there would have been enormous fear of being held hostage economically. Each would have sought to dominate the relationship, and the result would have been catastrophic. In the years before World War I, as a result of European interdependence, control of key national issues fell into the hands of foreign governments. Thus, decisions made in Paris had tremendous impact on Austria, and decisions made in London determined growth rates in the Ruhr. Each government sought to take charge of its own destiny by shift­ing the pattern of interdependence in its favor. Where economic means proved insufficient, political and military strategies were tried. The international system following the Cold War resembles the pre—World War I system in some fundamental ways. First, there is a gen­eral prosperity. That is to say, the international economic system appears to be functioning extremely well, in spite of the normal cyclical down­turns of the early 1990s. Second, almost no fundamental ideological issues divide the major powers; one could say there is general agreement on matters of political principle. Third, there is a long-standing pattern of interdependence, measured in both trade and financial flows—capital has become transuational. Fourth, and perhaps most important, beneath the apparent prosperity and stability there is a sense within each great power of a real and growing vulnerability to the actions of others. Some nations fear that growing protectionism will shift the balance of the sys­tem against them, while others are convinced that maintaining the cur­rent system will be devastating to their interests. Today, observers focus on the first three phenomena, as they did prior to World War I, and argue that there is no economic basis for polit­ical conflict. What they miss is that the subsurface sense of insecurity— experienced by Japan, the United States, and Europe—marks the beginning of such conflict. Thus, the argument that war is obsolete because of growing inter­dependence is unsupportable. War may be obsolete, but, if it is, it is not because of interdependence. As we have seen, World War I broke out at a time when interdependence was substantially higher than it is today; indeed, in all likelihood war broke out because interdependence was so high. Today, war remains not only possible but, as a simple statistical matter, highly likely

#### Free trade destroys the environment

Lang and Hines, ’93 **[**Tim, Director of Parents for Safe Food and Colin, Coordinator of Greenpeace International’s Economic Unit, *The New Protectionism*, p. 62-63]

The gearing of entire economies to increasing raw material exports for international trade also has its environmental impact at the point of extraction or production, especially in developing countries. Tropical timber is perhaps the best publicized case. Although the massive deforestation of the last decade has a range of causes, including clearing land for agriculture and grazing, mining, fuelwood gathering and trees felled for domestic use, the timber trade represents a significant proportion, about 50 per cent of the total production of industrial hardwood in tropical countries.8 The effect of timber trading on deforestation is larger than the mere numbers of trees cut down for export, since roads built for commercial logging bring in their wake farmers, miners and those seeking fuelwood. In 1991, this tropical timber industry was worth $6 billion, but it is beginning to decline as forests are decimated in one country after another to provide for the needs of Europe, Japan and North America. Thailand and the Philippines, which were once exporters, are now net inporters; Nigeria’s exports have slumped over the last decade and several other countries will soon be in the same position. At its most extreme, Sarawak, which along with Sabah provides more than 90 per cent of Japan’s tropical imports, is predicted by environmentalists to have no trees left for felling in five years time. This would be both an environmental disaster and a human tragedy, since it would destroy the homeland of the local Penan people, who are aggressively fighting this trend.9 The fate of timber in international trade is repeated with other commodities sold by the South. Developing countries exploit resources such as food, fish, minerals and energy for export mostly to repay debts, with often dire adverse environmental effects. Unfortunately when trying to halt the ill-effects of such trade, developing countries can be blocked by the free trade system. Indonesia, for example, banned the export, though not the felling, of raw logs and rattan from its rainforests in 1985. It justified this ban on environmental grounds, but the EC referred this to the GATT surveillance body as the forerunner to a formal challenge to try to overcome the ban.

#### Environmental collapse causes extinction

**Diner 94** ["The Army and the Endangered Species Act: Who's Endangering Whom" l/n]

By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems.   As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure.   The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues.   Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined effects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction.   Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, [hu]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss. ([ ] = correction)

#### Free trade massively decreases food security and increases famine – drives farmers out of business and decreases income globally

Mittal, policy director at the Institute for Food and Development Policy and coordinator of the US section of FIAN, 1997

(Anuradha, “The Politics of Hunger,” Earth Island Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 2, Spring)

Trade has a major bearing on access to food via its positive effect on economic growth, incomes and employment.... Without trade, people and countries would have to rely exclusively on their own production: Average income would be far lower, the choice of goods would be far less and hunger would increase. A look at India proves otherwise. During the last five years of trade liberalization, agricultural exports increased by more than 70 percent. At the same time, domestic food prices increased by at least 63 percent. A survey by India's National Institute of Nutrition shows that the average daily per capita consumption of cereals has dropped by 14 grams per person since the late 1980s. The Indian government is pushing exports, while denying ration cards to poor people and cutting family food quotas. Large segments of India's population are at the mercy of the open market's skyrocketing prices. Free trade has not led to increased food security. [Market Gains Trickle Away](http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.trinity.edu/ehost/detail?vid=1&hid=101&sid=49252a2d-f458-42ff-aa47-ddc783bec276%40sessionmgr107&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d" \l "toc" \o "Market Gains Trickle Away  )  The FAO argues that increased trade raises overall income, which "trickles down" to each household. In 1987, in India, 361 million people lived in abject poverty. Today, the proportion of households below the poverty line has increased in both rural and urban areas. In the 200 million-strong Indian middle class, lower-end incomes are dropping off, while upper-end incomes are increasing dramatically. If anything, free trade has caused benefits to trickle up. [Higher Income = Food Security?](http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.trinity.edu/ehost/detail?vid=1&hid=101&sid=49252a2d-f458-42ff-aa47-ddc783bec276%40sessionmgr107&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d" \l "toc" \o "Higher Income = Food Security?  )  The third FAO assumption -- that increasing household income will lead to greater food security -- is made even as the FAO document acknowledges that the trickle-down approach may make matters worse for farmers and peasants: Because small-scale producers often lack the resources necessary to grow export-oriented crops... they may find that commercial expansion has an inflationary effect on production costs and on land rent that may even make their traditional production less feasible. Small producers may abandon their land or be bought out by larger commercial interests... and export agriculture may worsen the position of the poor majority. According to government estimates, some 2 million small and marginal Indian farmers lose their subsidies or even their land each year. Putting India's food security in the hands of a few giant agribusinesses -while the poor are landless and unemployed -- is a sure recipe for famine. Land loss will become more common as new farm policies further relax rural land-holding laws for businesses. For almost a decade, the goal of national and international food and farm policies has been to lower consumer food prices by increasing food imports. Trade liberalization has kept farm prices in most countries at below-cost-of-production levels, putting many farmers (both in major exporting countries and importing countries) out of business. The US government currently plans to make more aggressive use of trade negotiations to dismantle foreign import tariffs, import quotas, production subsidies and other "trade barriers" to build food import demand abroad and fuel agricultural export growth. US dumping of underpriced grain surpluses has destroyed poor farmers in many food-importing countries. In 1965, the US unloaded grain in India in the name of "food aid," driving down the price of domestic wheat and curtailing native production. Over the past few years, the Mexican government put 1.8 million corn farmers out of business by choosing to import heavily subsidized corn from the US. Rock-bottom world corn prices (set by the US) averaging about half the cost of production have encouraged cattle farmers to concentrate on confined livestock operations (where cattle eat grain that otherwise would be used for human consumption). Low grain prices have made corn sweeteners so cheap that Pepsi and Coca-Cola have abandoned cane and beet sugar in favor of corn syrup, driving world sugar prices to all-time lows and cutting into the foreign exchange earnings of many Third World countries.

#### Economic ties are high and resilient

Wilson 11 – MA in International Affairs @ American U, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where he develops the Institute’s research and programming on regional economic integration and U.S.-Mexico border affairs (Christopher, “Working Together,” Mexico Institute @ Woodrow Institute, Scholar)//BB

The economic ties between the United States and Mexico are reinforced by a large web of social networks. Thirty-two million U.S. residents, or one in ten, are of Mexican origin, including roughly 12 million people born in Mexico.10 Perhaps a million Americans live in Mexico, almost a fifth of all Americans who live abroad.11 Close to 15,000 Mexicans are pursuing college degrees in the United States, and 13 million Mexicans visit the U.S. in 2010.12 As the top tourist destination for U.S. travelers, an even larger 19 million U.S. residents visit Mexico each year.13 Just as social networks often facilitate the creation of commercial relationships within the United States, the depth and intensity of bilateral social integration spurs the development of economic links between the U.S. and Mexico. Import and export relationships, production sharing arrangements, and investment opportunities are all made easier by the relatively high level of understanding derived from the geographic and cultural proximity of United States and Mexico.

#### O

## Structural Violence Adv.

#### **Util is inevitable even with deontology**

Joshua Green Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Harvard University, Joshua, November 2002 "The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It", 314

Some people who talk of balancing rights may think there is an algorithm for deciding which rights take priority over which. If that’s what we mean by 302 “balancing rights,” then we are wise to shun this sort of talk. Attempting to solve moral problems using a complex deontological algorithm is dogmatism at its most esoteric, but dogmatism all the same. However, it’s likely that when some people talk about “balancing competing rights and obligations” they are already thinking like consequentialists in spite of their use of deontological language. Once again, what deontological language does best is express the thoughts of people struck by strong, emotional moral intuitions: “It doesn’t matter that you can save five people by pushing him to his death. To do this would be a violation of his rights!”19 That is why angry protesters say things like, “Animals Have Rights, Too!” rather than, “Animal Testing: The Harms Outweigh the Benefits!” Once again, rights talk captures the apparent clarity of the issue and absoluteness of the answer. But sometimes rights talk persists long after the sense of clarity and absoluteness has faded. One thinks, for example, of the thousands of children whose lives are saved by drugs that were tested on animals and the “rights” of those children. One finds oneself balancing the “rights” on both sides by asking how many rabbit lives one is willing to sacrifice in order to save one human life, and so on, and at the end of the day one’s underlying thought is as thoroughly consequentialist as can be, despite the deontological gloss. And what’s wrong with that? Nothing, except for the fact that the deontological gloss adds nothing and furthers the myth that there really are “rights,” etc. Best to drop it. When deontological talk gets sophisticated, the thought it represents is either dogmatic in an esoteric sort of way or covertly consequentialist.

#### **Utilitarianism is inevitable**

Lincoln Allison, Professor of Political Philosophy at University of Warwick, 1990 (“The Utilitarianism Response”)

And yet if an idea can be compared to a castle, though we find a breached wall, damaged foundation and a weapons spiked where not actually destroyed, there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism. As Raymond Frey puts it, utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing ... [and] has come to have a significant impact upon the moral thinking of many laymen. The simple core of the doctrine lies in the ideas that actions should be judged by their consequences and that the best actions are those which make people, as-a whole, better off than do the alternatives. What utilitarianism always excludes there­fore, is any idea-about the Tightness or wrongness of actions which is not explicable in terms of the consequences of those actions. The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. Without a serious God (one, this is, prepared to reveal Truth and instruction) or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason, we are likely to turn towards Bentham and to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being.

#### **Survival of political order is key to ethics**

Stenlisli 3 (“Pace nr.1” accessed onlinehttp://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/ )

The debate on political realism, a set of ontological assumptions about international politics, has been a central theme in international relations over the past 40 years. Many scholars and politicians have wrestled over the question of the limitations and insights of realism. Still, realism seems very much alive today, one reason perhaps being that the value of realism as an analytical tool seems to become more relevant to policymakers in times of crises. In turn, such changes cause further debate among realists and their critics. In PACEM 5:2 (2002), Commander Raag Rolfsen[(1)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/" \l "1%231" \t "_blank) in practise argues that we are in need of a new framework for analysing international politics. According to Rolfsen, A situation characterized by globalisation, democratisation and a new sense of shared vulnerability demands a novel theoretical framework for world politics. Rolfsen`s aim is indeed ambitious, but his state of departure is surprising: political realism cannot provide this framework because, again according to Rolfsen, it was developed in an undemocratic environment.[(2)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/" \l "2%232" \t "_blank) Thus, we are not far from concluding that realism is corrupted and that realists are conspicuous people.[(3)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/" \l "3%233" \t "_blank) This bold proclamation illuminates the front between idealism and realism in a manner that is not typical of Norwegian academic discourses on international relations. Rolfsen has delivered a substantial and refreshing article. It is of such originality and importance that it deserves to be debated and criticised, which is no evident feature in contributions on world politics in Norway. Having said that, my motivation to engage in such a debate does not spring from a wholehearted embracement of realism. Rather, its source is the belief that a theory of foreign policy cannot do without significant elements of realism. Traditional security policy can never remove our vulnerability. At this point there simply is no disagreement between “realists” and “idealists”. However, security has an instrumental value in ensuring other ends. Thus, acknowledging our vulnerability does not remove the value and importance of security as phenomenon and concept.[(4)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/" \l "4%234" \t "_blank) In this article, I will discuss whether the effort to construct a new security concept possibly can succeed when it simultaneously becomes an attack on political realism (PR). Rolfsen undoubtedly deals some blows against Hans Morgenthau’s Theory of International Politics, although the same points have been made by others before him.[(5)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/" \l "5%235" \t "_blank) Indeed, political realism has to be anchored to ideals and visions of desired end states beyond its basic assumptions,[(6)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/" \l "6%236" \t "_blank) but my main line of argument is that any attempt at establishing a basis for ethical conduct in politics is bound to remain a purely theoretical construction without empirical relevance if it is not mixed with a sound and thorough understanding of PR. The reason simply is, that since the existence of a polity is a precondition for thinking about, implementing and evaluating policies in other areas, politics based on realism is required in the first place in order to secure the polity. There can be no democracy without a modern state, and no state without a minimum level of security through a monopoly of violence. Herein lies a significant aspect of what makes the state legitimate to its citizens. In this way, one can even claim that all normative evaluations and - theories implicitly rest on minimum requirements both to the practises and theoretical considerations of realism.[(7)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/" \l "7%237" \t "_blank) Indeed, one should at least question whether attempts at denying the empirical relevance of PR could lead us into paralysis or hypocrisy. The latter can even serve, unintentionally to be sure, as a basis for demonising opponents, thus functioning as a (moral) sentiment that forms the basis of a more hawkish or brutal conduct in international crisis than is necessary. The prudence found in Morgenthau should not be seen as cynical or a-ethical, but rather as a configuration of thought that should balance our aspirations to fulfil what Morgenthau calls the ultimate aims of politics. The central political problem is exactly how to translate these aspirations (like democracy and human rights) into feasible and efficient decisions. But in order to pursue these important goals, the ability to use power, be it hard or soft, is required.

#### **Extinction outweighs – it’s the most horrible impact imaginable and precedes rights**

Schell 82 (Jonathan, Professor at Wesleyan University, *The Fate of the Earth*, pages 136-137)

Implicit in everything that I have said so far about the nuclear predicament there has been a perplexity that I would now like to take up explicitly, for it leads, I believe, into the very heart of our response-or, rather, our lack of response-to the predicament. I have pointed out that our species is the most important of all the things that, as inhabitants of a common world, we inherit from the past generations, but it does not go far enough to point out this superior importance, as though in making our decision about ex- tinction we were being asked to choose between, say, liberty, on the one hand, and the survival of the species, on the other. For the species not only overarches but contains all the benefits of life in the common world, and to speak of sacrificing the species for the sake of one of these benefits involves one in the absurdity of wanting to de- stroy something in order to preserve one of its parts, as if one were to burn down a house in an attempt to redecorate the living room, or to kill someone to improve his character. ,but even to point out this absurdity fails to take the full measure of the peril of extinction, for mankind is not some invaluable object that lies outside us and that we must protect so that we can go on benefiting from it; rather, it is we ourselves, without whom everything there is loses its value. To say this is another way of saying that extinction is unique not because it destroys mankind as an object but because it destroys mankind as the source of all possible human subjects, and this, in turn, is another way of saying that extinction is a second death, for one's own individual death is the end not of any object in life but of the subject that experiences all objects. Death, how- ever, places the mind in a quandary. One of-the confounding char- acteristics of death-"tomorrow's zero," in Dostoevski's phrase-is that, precisely because it removes the person himself rather than something in his life, it seems to offer the mind nothing to take hold of. One even feels it inappropriate, in a way, to try to speak "about" death at all, as. though death were a thing situated some- where outside us and available for objective inspection, when the fact is that it is within us-is, indeed, an essential part of what we are. It would be more appropriate, perhaps, to say that death, as a fundamental element of our being, "thinks" in us and through us about whatever we think about, coloring our thoughts and moods with its presence throughout our lives

#### **One is morally obligated to divert to utilitarianism if the alternative is extinction.**

Kateb**,** prof. of politics at Princeton University, **19**92 (George, “The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture”, p. 12)

The main point, however, is that utilitarianism has a necessary pace in any democratic country's normal political deliberations. But its advocates must know its place, which ordinarily is only to help to decide what the theory of rights leaves alone. When may rights be overridden by government? I have two sorts of cases in mind: overriding a particular right of some persons for the sake of preserving the same right of others, and overriding the same right of everyone for the sake of what I will clumsily call "civilization values." An advocate of rights could countenance, perhaps must countenance, the state's overriding of rights for these two reasons. The subject is painful and liable to dispute every step of the way. For the state to override is, sacrifice—a right of some so that others may keep it. the situation must be desperate. I have in mind, say, circumstances in which the choice is between sacrificing a right of some and letting a right of all be lost. The state (or some other agent) may kill some (or allow them to he killed), if the only alternative is letting every-one die. It is the right to life which most prominently figures in thinking about desperate situations. I cannot see any resolution but to heed the precept that "numbers count." Just as one may prefer saving one's own life to saving that of another when both cannot be saved, so a third parry—let us say, the state—can (perhaps must) choose to save the greater number of lives and at the cost of the lesser number, when there is otherwise no hope for either group. That choice does not mean that those to be sacrificed are immoral if they resist being sacrificed. It follows, of course, that if a third party is right to risk or sacrifice the lives of the lesser for the lives of the greater number when the lesser would otherwise live, the lesser are also not wrong if they resist being sacrificed.

# Block

## Shunning

### 2NC – Mexico

#### ALSO Arraigo confirms

HRW 13 (Human Rights Watch 4-25-2013, “Mexico: Abolish “Arraigo” Detention from Constitution” <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/25/mexico-abolish-arraigo-detention-constitution> Date Accessed: 7-2-2013)

Neither the proposal to reduce the arraigo detention period to a maximum of 40 days, nor the proposal to replace it with up to 10 days of pre-charge detention under judicial control, complies with international human rights standards, Human Rights Watch said. Both the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights have indicated that a period in excess of four days before a person is brought before a judge to be charged or released is prima facie too long. While the Inter-American Court has only had to give judgment in a case involving a 15-day detention period with a 30-day maximum and ruled that it violated the American Convention on Human Rights, it has explicitly endorsed the approach of the European Court and Human Rights Committee on the importance of promptness in judicial control over detention. The UN Committee on Torture, the UN Group on Arbitrary Detentions, the UN Working Group on Enforced Disappearances, and the UN special rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers are among the international entities that have called for the abolition of pre-charge detention in Mexico. “Any additional time before a detainee is brought before a judge for charging – whether days or weeks, and whether it is called arraigo or another name – would constitute an unreasonable infringement on fundamental rights, and will create an environment ripe for more abuse,” Vivanco said. Human Rights Watch has documented scores of cases in which victims have been subjected to serious abuses – including torture and rape – in the period before and during preventive detention under the existing provision. For example, four men from Baja California – Ramiro Ramírez Martínez, Rodrigo Ramírez Martínez, Orlando Santaolaya and Ramiro López Vázquez – were arbitrarily detained in June 2009 and taken to an Army base, where military personnel applied electric charges to their genitals, asphyxiated them, pulled out their toenails, and beat them in front of one another until they signed false confessions. The confessions were then used against the men to obtain pre-charge detention orders from a judge. They were held during that period on a military base, where they were subjected to additional abuses.

### 2NC – A2 Shunning Immoral

#### “Solvency” isn’t necessary — voting neg bears witness and upholds the moral order.

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 20-21)

But perhaps Thompson's pragmatic argument against interfering in the affairs of other states rules out national shunning:

Respect for domestic jurisdiction causes diplomatists to question a crusading approach to human rights. Routine interference in the essential conduct of the affairs of one government (that is, in its definition of its rights and duties) by another is a recipe for disaster in political relationships. Furthermore, history offers little support for the assumption that moral intervention can even make the situation worse. Given the realities of national sovereignty, methods such as quiet diplomacy, the private offering of incentives and rewards, and sustained individual contacts are more likely to yield results. Workability is a companion principle to respect for domestic jurisdiction. Together they provide the diplomatists' main guidelines for action in human rights as in other spheres of foreign policy. (Thompson, 1980, pp. 91-92)

As a general caution against our desire to "do something" when we do not like the policies of another country, Thompson's pragmatic approach is sound. But shunning represents a special situation in which, persuasion and direct pressure having been tried and having failed, the objective is not to change behavior but to witness against it. "Workability" has been tried and has [end page 20] failed; the flagrant, persistent, and willful violation of human rights continues and must be confronted publicly.

#### Sanctions are ethical — necessary to protect the moral order.

He 11 — Wei He, holds L.L.B.s in Law from the University of Bristol and the University of International Business and Economics, 2011 (“Can ‘International Sanctions’ in Foreign Policy be Ethical?,” *e-International Relations*, August 27th, Available Online at http://www.e-ir.info/2011/08/27/can-%E2%80%98international-sanctions%E2%80%99-in-foreign-policy-be-ethical/, Accessed 07-22-2013)

This minimal convergence area, which is the respect for people’s right to live, is where international morality lies, and is also the source of legitimacy for international sanctions. If the government of a state is unable to guarantee its people’s right to live, the international sanctions imposed on the government can be deemed ethical. This argument reaches the same point as the notion of “the Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), which is best demonstrated in the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document which states that “[e] Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,” and the international community “are prepared to take collective action” if the state fails to do so (UN, 2005). However, the application of ethical international sanctions is not only limited to the range of the R2P. When the targeted government not only deprives its own people of the right to live, but also threatens such rights of people in other nations, the international sanctions are still ethical. In this sense, international sanctions are “a valuable instrument in international efforts to safeguard peace and security” (Sweden Government, no date). If peace and security can be achieved, the people’s right to live in the world will be guaranteed, which meets exactly the international moral requirement mentioned above.

## 2nc Dedev o/v (:35)

#### US-Mexico trade key revitalizes manufacturing and solves economy

O’Neill 3/18/13 – (Shannon, “Mexico and the United States are linked closer than ever through trade”, Voxxi, http://www.voxxi.com/mexico-united-states-linked-trade/)//javi

When it comes to Mexico, people usually think about the security issue, and that’s what much of the news coverage has been. But underneath that, behind the headlines, we have seen a transformation of Mexico’s economy over the last couple of decades: It has moved from a very closed, inward-looking economy, one whose exports were dominated by oil, to an economy that is one of the most open and increasingly competitive in the world. In measures like trade to GDP, Mexico outpaces not just the United States or places like Brazil, but it outpaces China. It is quite an open and competitive economy now. A big part of that is due to its deepening ties to the United States. Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) was signed almost 20 years ago, we have seen the creation of regional supply chains for a myriad of different types of industries and companies. For every product that is imported from Mexico in the US, on average 40 percent of it would actually have been made in the U.S. It has become a very symbiotic relationship, and it has become an integrated economy in many ways and in many sectors, particularly in manufacturing. There, we see almost seamless integration in some companies, where production happens on both sides of the border. What it means is these economies, companies and industries are now not only intimately tied, but permanently tied at this point. Mexico’s positive future tied to the United States Mexico’s positive future is closely tied to the United States, in part because of this integration of production. If it does extend beyond the United States, it would most likely be through an expansion of what is already this North American production platform, through agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would expand Nafta beyond Canada and Mexico, to include other Latin American countries and many Asia Pacific countries. It is quite a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement, and one could see it expanding in production chains in many other countries that are participants, and sales would be going up. The U.S., for all of its hiccups in recent years, is still the largest market in the world, so being tied to the U.S. is not a bad thing at all. Recently, talk about a mega-agreement on trade between the world’s biggest trading bloc—the European Union—and the United States has surfaced. But it is not clear at all that this would hurt Mexico; it already has its own trade agreement with the EU and, on the other hand, there may be incentives to extend the EU-U.S. trade agreement to include other countries.

#### US is an integral part of Mexican manufacturing industry which solves the economy

Villarreal 8/9/12 – (M. Angeles, “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications”, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf)//javi

Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an integral part of the economic relationship between the United States and Mexico since NAFTA implementation. FDI consists of investments in real estate, manufacturing plants, and retail facilities, in which the foreign investor owns 10% or more of the entity. The United States is the largest source of FDI in Mexico. The stock of U.S. FDI increased from $17.0 billion in 1994 to $91.4 billion in 2011, a 440% increase (see Table 4). Mexican FDI in the United States is much lower than U.S. investment in Mexico, with levels of Mexican FDI fluctuating over the last 10 years. In 2010, Mexican FDI in the United States totaled $12.6 billion (see Table 4). The sharp rise in U.S. investment in Mexico since NAFTA is also a result of the liberalization of Mexico’s restrictions on foreign investment in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Prior to the mid-1980s, Mexico had a very protective policy that restricted foreign investment and controlled the exchange rate to encourage domestic growth, affecting the entire industrial sector. Mexico’s trade liberalization measures and economic reform in the late 1980s represented a sharp shift in policy and helped bring in a steady increase of FDI flows into Mexico. NAFTA provisions on foreign investment helped to lock in the reforms and increase investor confidence. Under NAFTA, Mexico gave U.S. and Canadian investors nondiscriminatory treatment of their investments as well as investor protection. NAFTA may have encouraged U.S. FDI in Mexico by increasing investor confidence, but much of the growth may have occurred anyway because Mexico likely would have continued to liberalize its foreign investment laws with or without the agreement. Nearly half of total FDI investment in Mexico is in the manufacturing industry, of which the maquiladora industry forms a major part. (See “Mexico’s Export-Oriented Assembly Plants” below.) In Mexico, the industry has helped attract investment from countries such as the United States that have a relatively large amount of capital. For the United States, the industry is important because U.S. companies are able to locate their labor-intensive operations in Mexico and lower their labor costs in the overall production process.

#### Now key – delay makes extinction inevitable

**Ledger 12** – (Florida news service citing Richard Heinberg, senior fellow at the Post-Carbon Institute. Yossim Hizzod, “Unsustainable Economy”, <http://www.theledger.com/article/20121127/EDIT02/121129434>)//SDL

With the Industrial Revolution came the idea of material progress possible for all mankind, with infinite economic growth. Alas, we live on a finite planet with finite resources.¶ A profoundly important 2012 book is "The End of Growth, Adapting to Our New Economic Reality," by Richard Heinberg. Mr. Heinberg says three big factors are converging, which will someday soon end most of all further economic growth in current modern industrial nations and also in nations which want to industrialize, e.g., China and India.¶ These three factors are:¶ The fast-approaching depletion of Earth's resources needed for industry to function.¶ The saturation point of the Earth to absorb toxic wastes and poisons from industrialization, e.g., global warming from carbon dioxide.¶ Modern societies now reaching the saturation point and the end of ability to use credit(national deficits) to stimulate more economic growth.¶ From Mr. Heinberg's book, it can be implied that if we first acknowledge this situation (maybe politically impossible) and then work to manage the coming economic decline, we can stop the regression at an 1880s economic level with trains and horses for transportation, thus maintain a national cohesion and national identity.¶ If leaders and voters ignore and deny the problem and do not try to manage the decline, we will get random chaos and a possible die-off of a large segment of the population from starvation, lack of medical care, etc. Survivors might return to a feudal type lifestyle where strongmen warlords rule isolated, disconnected regions. Or the worst-case scenario could be a return to a Stone-Age or Iron-Age system of tribes (gangs) fighting over the scarce resources.

**View this debate through a lens of warming – it makes econ collapse inevitable – they must first beat that to get any of their offense**

Thomas Homer-Dixon, 11 – (Thomas Homer-Dixon, the CIGI chair of global systems at the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo. January, 2011. “Economies can’t just keep on growing,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/unconventional\_wisdom?page=0,1)//SDL

Humanity has made great strides over the past 2,000 years, and we often assume that our path, notwithstanding a few bumps along the way, goes ever upward. But we are wrong: Within this century, environmental and resource constraints will likely bring global economic growth to a halt. Limits on available resources already restrict economic activity in many sectors, though their impact usually goes unacknowledged. Take rare-earth elements -- minerals and oxides essential to the manufacture of many technologies. When China recently stopped exporting them, sudden shortages threatened to crimp a wide range of industries. Most commentators believed that the supply crunch would ease once new (or mothballed) rare-earth mines are opened. But such optimism overlooks a fundamental physical reality. As the best bodies of ore are exhausted, miners move on to less concentrated deposits in more difficult natural circumstances. These mines cause more pollution and require more energy. In other words, opening new rare-earth mines outside China will result in staggering environmental impact. Or consider petroleum, which provides about 40 percent of the world's commercial energy and more than 95 percent of its transportation energy. Oil companies generally have to work harder to get each new barrel of oil. The amount of energy they receive for each unit of energy they invest in drilling has dropped from 100 to 1 in Texas in the 1930s to about 15 to 1 in the continental United States today. The oil sands in Alberta, Canada, yield a return of only 4 to 1. Coal and natural gas still have high energy yields. So, as oil becomes harder to get in coming decades, these energy sources will become increasingly vital to the global economy. But they're fossil fuels, and burning them generates climate-changing carbon dioxide. If the World Bank's projected rates for global economic growth hold steady, global output will have risen almost tenfold by 2100, to more than $600 trillion in today's dollars. So even if countries make dramatic reductions in carbon emissions per dollar of GDP, global carbon dioxide emissions will triple from today's level to more than 90 billion metric tons a year. Scientists tell us that tripling carbon emissions would cause such extreme heat waves, droughts, and storms that farmers would likely find they couldn't produce the food needed for the world's projected population of 9 billion people. Indeed, the economic damage caused by such climate change would probably, by itself, halt growth.

## 2nc – Indo/Pak (1:10)

#### Decline is key to prevent indian economic collapse

Knowledge @ Wharton 11 (“Global Economic Crisis: Dark Clouds or a Silver Lining for India?” http://knowledgetoday.wharton.upenn.edu/2011/08/global-economic-crisis-dark-clouds-or-a-silver-lining-for-india/)

India has **actually** been fighting its own battles, **very different from those in the U.S. and Euroland. The villain is inflation. Today, everything else is being sacrificed to control that. While raising the interest rate, the RBI reduced its GDP growth estimate from 8.5% to 8%. Expectedly, the rate hike has been opposed by industry and exporters. In a letter to the RBI before the rate hike was announced, the Indian Merchants Chamber said: “[**An] increase in the interest rate would have significant negative impact on business competitiveness. **This would be more crucial in the wake of the slowdown of India’s economic growth and decline in industrial production.” Interest rates have been raised 14 times since February 2010. The repo rate (the rate at which the RBI lends to banks) is now 8%. “The RBI had very little option but to go for another hike,” says Hemant Kanoria, CMD of Srei Infrastructure Finance. “But the 50 bps hike is much above comfort levels.** The higher interest rates will only curb investor appetite. The manufacturing sector is unlikely to witness any fresh investment in the near term**.”** The global financial crisis should actually help industry on the interest rate **front. The RBI is likely to ease the rate hikes as growth slows down and inflation starts looking more reasonable. The stock markets have gone down, but they have been looking more solid after an initial knee-jerk plunge. On Wednesday morning, they were up 2%.** Commodity and crude prices are likely to fall because of the global crisis; that trend is already visible. This will **also** have a beneficial effect on inflation in the country. **On the obverse side, exporters will feel the pinch. IT companies are putting up a brave front, but they won’t escape unscathed. India’s exposure to U.S. debt is estimated at US$41 billion; it is the 14th largest holder of U.S. treasuries. China is the highest with US$1.15 trillion. In the past year, Indian holdings have grown by about US$10 billion. But this debt is, of course, a global problem. “**India is in a better position than other nations to meet the challenge posed by the developments,**” says Mukherjee. “We** will focus on encouraging greater domestic consumption and give impetus to the drivers of domestic growth.” But the biggest benefit is that the crisis might give the government the opportunity to put in process a new set of economic reforms**.** For India, this might actually be another turning point

#### Collapse causes Indo/Pak war

Mamoon & Murshed, Professor the Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham & Centre for the Study of Civil War, 10

(Dawood & Mansoob, “The conflict mitigating effects of trade in the India-Pakistan case” Econ Gov, 11:145, p160-161, 2010,<http://www.springerlink.com/content/4736rl34w118q532/fulltext.pdf>)

However, **if India is able to export or import more, this would at least put a check on any rise in the severity of conflict and hostilities would adjust to some average level. Any decline in Indian trade will enhance hostilities**. **The current low levels of bilateral trade between Pakistan and India is conflict enhancing, so more trade with increased exports by both sides to each other should be encouraged.** More access to Pakistani markets on the Indian side may not lead to conflict mitigation if Pakistan is not able toalso export more to India. **A rise in education expenditure puts a check on hostilities**, as seen in Graph 1e. Graph 1f is the standard representation of India-Pakistan conflict,and not only best fits historical trends but also explain the rationale behind recent India-Pakistan peace initiatives with decreasing hostilities when not only India but Pakistan also has had economic growth rates as high as 7% per annum. The forecasts suggest that **conflict will rise, even if there is a significant increase in combined democracy scores, if growth rates plummet. Both Pakistan and India have seen many such years, when hostilities between both countries rose significantly when at least one of the countries is performing poorly, but were channeling more resources on the military as a proportion of their GDPs**. The forecasts favour the economic version over the democratic version of the liberal peace. Thus one may look at current peace talks between both countries with optimism as both are performing well on the economic front and channeling fewer resources on the military as a proportion of national income, while at the same time having a divergent set of political institutions, though recently Pakistan has edged towards greater democracy with elections in February 2008.

#### Goes nuclear and causes extinction

Reville 10  (William, Associate Prof. Biochem. and Public Awareness Science Officer – University College Cork, Irish Times, “Nuclear Winter Weather Forecast”, 2/4, L/N)

You might think that the probability of nuclear winter has all but disappeared now that the Cold War has ended. Unfortunately not. Nuclear arsenals have grown in many countries and the prospect of regional nuclear conflicts is all too real. Recent calculations, described by Alan Robock and Owen B Toon in Scientific American, January 2010, demonstrate that even a regional nuclear war could precipitate global nuclear winter.  Nuclear winter, you will recall, develops as follows. Nuclear explosions ignite massive fire-storms, causing smoke to rise high into the atmosphere to be carried around the globe. This smoke blots out the sun, causing darkness and permanent freezing. Plants cannot grow, food production quickly fails and billions die. Civilisation is destroyed and, possibly, all humans die. This scenario has been carefully studied and nuclear winter is the mature prediction of mainstream science.  Since the end of the Cold War, America and Russia have greatly reduced their arsenals, but they still retain considerable nuclear weaponry. Nine countries have nuclear weapons and they are ranked as follows in order of the number of warheads they possess: Russia (15,000), US (9,900), France (350), China (200), UK (200), Israel (80), Pakistan (60), India (50), North Korea (10+). In addition, Iran may be developing nuclear weapons.  There is a real possibility of nuclear war between India and Pakistan and Robock and Toon have evaluated the consequences. They assume that such a warwould quickly escalate out of control, with the deployment of full nuclear arsenals on both sides. They reason as follows: Pakistan is a small country and could be easily overrun and immobilised by Indian conventional forces. Pakistan would be tempted to release its nuclear arsenal before being overrun and India would respond in kind. They assume that each side would drop 50 bombs on major cities and industrial areas each about the size of the one dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.  The authors estimate that 20 million would die immediately from direct blast, fire and radiation. Seven million metric tons of smoke would then rise up through the atmosphere (troposphere) and into the lower stratosphere. Within five days the smoke would cover the war region,within nine days it would reach around the globe, and within 49 days it would cover the inhabited earth.  Smoke from nuclear fires would stay aloft for 10 years and would block enough sunlight to maintain overcast conditions everywhere. Climate models forecast that this smoke would quickly cool the earth to below temperatures experienced for the past 1,000 years.  According to the authors these changes would play havoc with agricultural production and big drops in crop yields would occur everywhere. Panic would cripple the global agricultural system. About one billion peopleworldwide live on marginal food supplies and they could die from famine.  The nuclear winter envisaged in the 1980s in the aftermath ofnuclear war would destroy civilisation and possibly eliminate the human race. A nuclear winter after a regional war would be less calamitous in scale. But it would set civilisation back 100 years and this is to assume that social order is maintained and that all we would have to recover from is environmental degradation. But, of course, social order could break down leading to chaos, with God knows what results. The authors put it plainly when they say: The only way to eliminate the possibility of climatic catastrophe is to elimi

# 2NC Uniqueness

**Collapse is inevitable – increasing complexity makes a growth society unsustainable and all recent models agree.**

Hengeveld 12 – (2012, Rob, PhD, Professor of Earth and Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, “Our apocalyptic odds,” [http://www.salon.com/2012/04/14/our\_apocalyptic\_odds/](http://www.salon.com/2012/04/14/our_apocalyptic_odds/" \t "_blank))

 Because they are much of a jumble as well, societies can crash or collapse. Such crashes not only develop rapidly, but their cause, course, and timing are unpredictable. Mathematicians call this field of study deterministic chaos: unpredictability reigns, even when nothing happens by chance; chance within the process only gives additional unpredictability. Imagine, therefore, what happens when such systems contain an element of chance as well.¶ So, how does chance work, and does chance depend on the number of people making up society and its complexity? If so, does the chance of societal collapse increase over time as our numbers and their resulting societal complexity grow? Have our living conditions changed (gradual soil salination, or a sudden rise in the price of food due to drought in Australia or Russia, for example)?¶ Think for a moment of a die: what is the chance of throwing, say, a five? A die has six sides, each with the same chance of turning up. The chance of throwing a five is one in six, or 17 percent. Conversely, the combined chance of throwing any number other than five is five in six, or 83 percent. But how great is the chance of getting a five within two consecutive throws? That chance is obviously twice as large, or 33 percent, and the chance of getting any other number is 67 percent. Therefore, the more throws, the greater the chance of getting your preferred five at least once. And the chance of missing it reduces accordingly. The same reasoning applies to, say, the chance of some explosion happening in an oil pipe, though in this case you are interested in the chance of the event not happening. Now the chance that some disaster will not happen is made as small as possible, say, one in 10,000, and the chance of an explosion occurring is only one in 9,999. Obviously, these chances also depend on the length of the pipe, on the number of pipes, on the number of welds, or the number of pumping and control stations, that is, on the complexity of the pipe system, and also on the length of the period the system is operating: the longer the pipes and the more there are, the greater the complexity of the system they form and the longer the period of operation, the greater the chance of something going wrong, resulting in an explosion.¶ Moreover, all these mistakes and disasters have different chances of happening, and all these chances are superimposed. You can try out for yourself what happens by throwing different kinds of dice, the normal one with six sides, then one with four, eight, ten, twelve, twenty, and one with thirty sides. The result is a very wiggly line when you add the outcomes of these sets of dice for a number of throws together for each point on this line. Each new point is different from any of the previous ones and therefore is impossible to predict; it was already impossible to predict the outcome of one single die. Still, this curve resembles the real world in many respects where also many chance events occur, the one adding to another and each with a different chance of happening.¶ In reality, the chances have different and varying weights relative to the total process as well, and they interact both linearly and nonlinearly, which we all kept constant and independent when we threw our seven sets of dice. How can we predict the future of society but in general terms of depletion and pollution rates? These are our certainties, but we really can’t predict in detail what will happen and when as a social or economic result. For these societal effects we can only say that the chance of collapse increases with an increasing complexity of society, as well as with increasing stress from resource depletion, pollution, and social inequality.¶ Think of the decline of ancient Rome, which took centuries; nobody knows why it declined; we have more explanations than authors. Because of the great influence of chance in all aspects of society, whose behavior is unknowable and, hence, unpredictable—manageable only up to some point, after which further developments grow out of hand. Why the reason for a crash such as the decline of Rome is also unknowable, and why its crash was unmanageable, is that people usually look at only one process in isolation, such as the invasion of the Gothic tribes or the general poisoning of people by lead in the water pipes. In many cases, however, a disaster is triggered by the coinciding of a number of different events or processes, not by a single event or process. Therefore, as our numbers continue to grow exponentially, the size and complexity of society increases exponentially relative to those numbers. Consequently, the predictability of a particular crash developing from the occurrence of a certain combination of chance events or processes decreases.¶ Moreover, because many factors can be interdependent, a crash in one sector pulls others in its wake,making it a general crash in no time and also making it more difficult to manipulate or manage.Crashes of our socioeconomic system will **therefore** become more frequent and less easy to control.¶ I think that the collapse of the present human population, its numbers and quality of life, is likely, and also that the most humane way to weather this period is to design a strategy and follow it ourselves rather than sit back and wait complacently. Unfortunately, the time for old customs and cultural traditions or of long-held beliefs and trusts is over. As the latest calculations from 1992 by Meadows and colleagues in “Beyond the Limits“ showed, our world can collapse, and this can happen even before any resource has definitively been depleted; collapse may come at any time and out of nowhere. It’s an inevitable, unavoidable result of **the behavior of** an oversized, complex, nonlinear system in which interdependent chance processes dominate.¶ The wave of large-scale deregulations because of the globalization of the last thirty years have only made this worse by allowing more positive feedback loops into the system. Nobody knows exactly how likely it is that our societal system will collapse or when. We know that this is theoretically inescapable, because all the local and national infrastructures and the global superstructure are based on abstractions. Moreover, system collapse follows from almost any simulation experiment based on relatively recent data—data that are now already twenty years old and are therefore too optimistic. In those twenty years, it has become even more likely that the conditions theoretically leading to system collapse will occur.

# 2NC Warming

**1% risk of extinction outweighs everything else**

**Bostrum 5** (Nick – prof of philosophy at Oxford University and recipient of the Gannon Award, Transcribed by Packer, 4:38-6:12, p. http://www.ted.com/index.php/talks/view/id/44, accessed 10/20/07)

**Now if we think about what just reducing the probability of human extinction by just one percentage point**. Not very much. So **that’s equivalent to 60 million lives saved, if we just count currently living people**. The current generation. One percent of six billion people is equivalent to 60 million. So that’s a large number. **If we were to take into account future generations that will never come into existence** if we blow ourselves up then **the figure becomes astronomical**. If we could you know eventually colonize a chunk of the universe the virgo supercluster maybe it will take us a hundred million years to get there but if we go extinct we never will. **Then even a one percentage point reduction in the extinction risk could be equivalent to this astronomical number 10 to the power of 32** so if you take into account future **generations** as much as our own **every other moral imperative or philanthropic cause just becomes irrelevant. The only thing you should focus on would be to reduce existential risk, because even the tiniest decrease in existential risk would just overwhelm any other benefit you could hope to achieve**. Even if you just look at the current people and ignore the potential that would be lost if we went extinct it should still be a high priority.

**Makes war inevitable**

**Homer-Dixon 1994** – Centre for International Governance Innovation Chair of Global Systems at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Professor in the Centre for Environment and Business in the Faculty of Environment at the University of Waterloo, PhD in IR from MIT (Thomas, International Security, 19.1)

If such "environmental scarcities" become severe, could they precipitate violent civil or international conflict? I have previously surveyed the issues and evidence surrounding this question and proposed an agenda for further research.1 Here I report the results of an international research project guided by this agenda.2 Following a brief review of my original hypotheses and the project's research design, I present several general findings of this research that led me to revise the original hypotheses. The article continues with an account of empirical evidence for and against the revised hypotheses, and it concludes with an assessment of the implications of environmentally induced conflict for international security. In brief, our research showed that environmental scarcities are already contributing to violent conflicts in many parts of the developing world. These conflicts are probably the early signs of an upsurge of violence in the coming decades that will be induced or aggravated by scarcity. The violence will usually be sub-national, persistent, and diffuse. Poor societies will be particularly affected since they are less able to buffer themselves from environmental scarcities and the social crises they cause. These societies are, in fact, already suffering acute hardship from shortages of water, forests, and especially fertile land. Social conflict is not always a bad thing: mass mobilization and civil strife can produce opportunities for beneficial change in the distribution of land and wealth and in processes of governance. But fast-moving, unpredictable, and complex environmental problems can overwhelm efforts at constructive social reform. Moreover, scarcity can sharply increase demands on key institutions, such as the state, while it simultaneously reduces their capacity to meet those demands. These pressures increase the chance that the state will either fragment or become more authoritarian. The negative effects of severe environmental scarcity are therefore likely to outweigh the positive.

## Coercion

SECOND-SERIAL POLICY FAILURE – the plan creates a monopoly that ensures ineffectively ran programs –TURNS CASE – EPISTEMOLOGY COMES FIRST - Cause-and-effect claims are a pre-requisite to evaluating their policy

**Rockwell** Jr., president of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 5/19/**2008**

(Llewellyn, “Everything You Love You Owe to Capitalism,” <http://mises.org/story/2982>)

BLUE

Not even an event as spectacular as the spontaneous meltdown of a superpower and all its client states was enough to impart the message of economic freedom. And the truth is that it was not necessary. The whole of our world is covered with lessons about the merit of economic liberty over central planning. Our everyday lives are dominated by the glorious products of the market, which we all gladly take for granted. We can open up our web browsers and tour an electronic civilization that the market created, and note that government never did anything useful at all by comparison. We are also inundated daily by the failures of the state. We complain constantly that the educational system is broken, that the medical sector is oddly distorted, that the post office is unaccountable, that the police abuse their power, that the politicians have lied to us, that tax dollars are stolen, that whatever bureaucracy we have to deal with is inhumanly unresponsive. We note all this. But far fewer are somehow able to connect the dots and see the myriad ways in which daily life confirms that the market radicals like Mises, Hayek, Hazlitt, and Rothbard were correct in their judgments. What's more, this is not a new phenomenon that we can observe in our lifetimes only. We can look at any country in any period and note that every bit of wealth ever created in the history of mankind has been generated through some kind of market activity, and never by governments. Free people create; states destroy. It was true in the ancient world. It was true in the first millennium after Christ. It was true in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. And with the birth of complex structures of production and the increasing division of labor in those years, we see how the accumulation of capital led to what might be called a productive miracle. The world's population soared. We saw the creation of the middle class. We saw the poor improve their plight and change their own class identification. The empirical truth has never been hard to come by. What matters are the theoretical eyes that see. This is what dictates the lesson we draw from events. Marx and Bastiat were writing at the same time. The former said capitalism was creating a calamity and that abolition of ownership was the solution. Bastiat saw that statism was creating a calamity and that the abolition of state plunder was the solution. What was the difference between them? They saw the same facts, but they saw them in very different ways. They had a different perception of cause and effect. I suggest to you that there is an important lesson here as regards the methodology of the social sciences, as well as an agenda and strategy for the future. Concerning method, we need to recognize that Mises was precisely right concerning the relationship between facts and economic truth. If we have a solid theory in mind, the facts on the ground provide excellent illustrative material. They inform us about the application of theory in the world in which we live. They provided excellent anecdotes and revealing stories of how economic theory is confirmed in practice. But absent that theory of economics, facts alone are nothing but facts. They do not convey any information about cause and effect, and they do not point a way forward. Think of it this way. Let's say you have a bag of marbles that is turned upside down on the ground. Ask two people their impressions. The first one understands what numbers mean, what shapes mean, and what colors mean. This person can give a detailed account of what he sees: how many marbles, what kinds, how big they are, and this person can explain what he sees in different ways potentially for hours. But now consider the second person, who, we can suppose, has absolutely no understanding of numbers, not even that they exist as abstract ideas. This person has no comprehension of either shape or color. He sees the same scene as the other person but cannot provide anything like an explanation of any patterns. He has very little to say. All he sees is a series of random objects. Both these people see the same facts. But they understand them in very different ways, owing to the abstract notions of meaning that they carry in their minds. This is why positivism as pure science, a method of assembling a potentially infinite series of data points, is a fruitless undertaking. Data points on their own convey no theory, suggest no conclusions, and offer no truths. To arrive at truth requires the most important step that we as human beings can ever take: thinking. Through this thinking, and with good teaching and reading, we can put together a coherent theoretical apparatus that helps us understand. Now, we have a hard time conjuring up in our minds the likes of a man [person] who has no comprehension of numbers, colors, or shapes. And yet I suggest to you that this is precisely what we are facing when we encounter a person who has never thought about economic theory and never studied the implications of the science at all. The facts of the world look quite random to this person. He sees two societies next to each other, one free and prosperous and the other unfree and poor. He looks at this and concludes nothing important about economic systems because he has never thought hard about the relationship between economic systems and prosperity and freedom. He merely accepts the existence of wealth in one place and poverty in the other as a given, the same way the socialists at a lunch table assumed that the luxurious surroundings and food just happened to be there. Perhaps they will reach for an explanation of some sort, but absent economic education, it is not likely to be the correct one. Equally as dangerous as having no theory is having a bad theory that is assembled not by means of logic but by an incorrect view of cause and effect. This is the case with notions such as the Phillips Curve, which posits a tradeoff relationship between inflation and unemployment. The idea is that you can drive unemployment down very low if you are willing to tolerate high inflation; or it can work the other way around: you can stabilize prices provided you are willing to put up with high unemployment. Now, of course this makes no sense on the microeconomic level. When inflation is soaring, businesses don't suddenly say, hey, let's hire a bunch of new people! Nor do they say, you know, the prices we pay for inventory have not gone up or have fallen. Let's fire some workers! This much is true about macroeconomics: It is commonly treated like a subject completely devoid of any connection to microeconomics or even human decision making. It is as if we enter into a video game featuring fearsome creatures called Aggregates that battle it out to the death. So you have one creature called Unemployment, one called Inflation, one called Capital, one called Labor, and so on until you can construct a fun game that is sheer fantasy. Another example of this came to me just the other day. A recent study claimed that labor unions increase the productivity of firms. How did the researchers discern this? They found that unionized companies tend to be larger with more overall output than nonunionized companies. Well, let's think about this. Is it likely that if you close a labor pool to all competition, give that restrictive labor pool the right to use violence to enforce its cartel, permit that cartel to extract higher-than-market wages from the company and set its own terms concerning work rules and vacations and benefits — is it likely that this will be good for the company in the long run? You have to take leave of your senses to believe this. In fact, what we have here is a simple mix-up of cause and effect. Bigger companies tend to be more likely to attract a kind of unpreventable unionization than smaller ones. The unions target them, with federal aid. It is no more or less complicated than that. It is for the same reason that developed economies have larger welfare states. The parasites prefer bigger hosts; that's all. We would be making a big mistake to assume that the welfare state causes the developed economy. That would be as much a fallacy as to believe that wearing $2,000 suits causes people to become rich. I'm convinced that Mises was right: the most important step economists or economic institutions can take is in the direction of public education in economic logic. There is another important factor here. The state thrives on an economically ignorant public. This is the only way it can get away with blaming inflation or recession on consumers, or claiming that the government's fiscal problems are due to our paying too little in taxes. It is economic ignorance that permits the regulatory agencies to claim that they are protecting us as versus denying us choice. It is only by keeping us all in the dark that it can continue to start war after war — violating rights abroad and smashing liberties at home — in the name of spreading freedom. There is only one force that can put an end to the successes of the state, and that is an economically and morally informed public. Otherwise, the state can continue to spread its malicious and destructive policies.

## Structural Violence

## 2NC – Extinciton Bad

Extinction matters—we have an ethical obligation to value future lives. Our argument is not that it matters to protect future lives more than current ones, but total disregard for humanity’s future is morally repugnant.

Jason Matheny Department of Health Policy and Management, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University 2007 “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction.” *Risk Analysis.* Vol 27, No 5, 2007, http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2007\_orig-articles/2007-10-15-reducingrisk.html

5. Discounting An extinction event today could cause the loss of thousands of generations. This matters to the extent we value future lives. Society places some value on future lives when it accepts the costs of long-term environmental policies or hazardous waste storage. Individuals place some value on future lives when they adopt measures, such as screening for genetic diseases, to ensure the health of children who do not yet exist. Disagreement, then, does not center on whether future lives matter, but on how much they matter.6 Valuing future lives less than current ones (“intergenerational discounting”) has been justified by arguments about time preference, growth in consumption, uncertainty about future existence, and opportunity costs. I will argue that none of these justifications applies to the benefits of delaying human extinction. Under time preference, a good enjoyed in the future is worth less, intrinsically, than a good enjoyed now. The typical justification for time preference is descriptive—most people make decisions that suggest that they value current goods more than future ones. However, it may be that people’s time preference applies only to instrumental goods, like money, whose value predictably decreases in time. In fact, it would be difficult to design an experiment in which time preference for an intrinsic good (like happiness), rather than an instrumental good (like money), is separated from the other forms of discounting discussed below. But even supposing individuals exhibit time preference within their own lives, it is not clear how this would ethically justify discounting across different lives and generations (Frederick, 2006; Schelling, 2000). In practice, discounting the value of future lives would lead to results few of us would accept as being ethical. For instance, if we discounted lives at a 5% annual rate, a life today would have greater intrinsic value than a billion lives 400 years hence (Cowen & Parfit, 1992). Broome (1994) suggests most economists and philosophers recognize that this preference for ourselves over our descendents is unjustifiable and agree that ethical impartiality requires setting the intergenerational discount rate to zero. After all, if we reject spatial discounting and assign equal value to contemporary human lives, whatever their physical distance from us, we have similar reasons to reject temporal discounting, and assign equal value to human lives, whatever their temporal distance from us. I Parfit (1984), Cowen (1992), and Blackorby et al. (1995) have similarly argued that time preference across generations is not ethically defensible.7 There could still be other reasons to discount future generations. A common justification for discounting economic goods is that their abundance generally increases with time. Because there is diminishing marginal utility from consumption, future generations may gain less satisfaction from a dollar than we will (Schelling, 2000). This principle makes sense for intergenerational transfers of most economic goods but not for intergenerational transfers of existence. There is no diminishing marginal utility from having ever existed. There is no reason to believe existence matters less to a person 1,000 years hence than it does to a person 10 years hence. Discounting could be justified by our uncertainty about future generations’ existence. If we knew for certain that we would all die in 10 years, it would not make sense for us to spend money on asteroid defense. It would make more sense to live it up, until we become extinct. A discount scheme would be justified that devalued (to zero) anything beyond 10 years. Dasgupta and Heal (1979, pp. 261–262) defend discounting on these grounds—we are uncertain about humanity’s long-term survival, so planning too far ahead is imprudent.8 Discounting is an approximate way to account for our uncertainty about survival (Ponthiere, 2003). But it is unnecessary—an analysis of extinction risk should equate the value of averting extinction at any given time with the expected value of humanity’s future from that moment forward, which includes the probabilities of extinction in all subsequent periods (Ng, 2005). If we discounted the expected value of humanity’s future, we would count future extinction risks twice—once in the discount rate and once in the undiscounted expected value—and underestimate the value of reducing current risks. In any case, Dasgupta and Heal’s argument does not justify traditional discounting at a constant rate, as the probability of human extinction is unlikely to be uniform in time.9 Because of nuclear and biological weapons, the probability of human extinction could be higher today than it was a century ago; and if humanity colonizes other planets, the probability of human extinction could be lower then than it is today. Even Rees’s (2003) pessimistic 50-50 odds on human extinction by 2100 would be equivalent to an annual discount rate under 1% for this century. (If we are 100% certain of a good’s existence in 2007 but only 50% certain of a good’s existence in 2100, then the expected value of the good decreases by 50% over 94 years, which corresponds to an annual discount rate of 0.75%.) As Ng (1989) has pointed out, a constant annual discount rate of 1% implies that we are more than 99.99% certain of not surviving the next 1,000 years. Such pessimism seems unwarranted. A last argument for intergenerational discounting is from opportunity costs: without discounting, we would always invest our money rather than spend it now on important projects (Broome, 1994). For instance, if we invest our money now in a stock market with an average 5% real annual return, in a century we will have 130 times more money to spend on extinction countermeasures (assuming we survive the century). This reasoning could be extended indefinitely (as long as we survive). This could be an argument for investing in stocks rather than extinction countermeasures if: the rate of return on capital is exogenous to the rate of social savings, the average rate of return on capital is higher than the rate of technological change in extinction countermeasures, and the marginal cost effectiveness of extinction countermeasures does not decrease at a rate equal to or greater than the return on capital. First, the assumption of exogeneity can be rejected. Funding extinction countermeasures would require spending large sums; if, instead, we invested those sums in the stock market, they would affect the average market rate of return (Cowen & Parfit, 1992). Second, some spending on countermeasures, such as research on biodefense, has its own rate of return, since learning tends to accelerate as a knowledge base expands. This rate could be higher than the average rate of return on capital. Third, if the probability of human extinction significantly decreases after space colonization, there may be a small window of reducible risk: the period of maximum marginal cost effectiveness may be limited to the next few centuries. Discounting would be a crude way of accounting for opportunity costs, as cost effectiveness is probably not constant. A more precise approach would identify the optimal invest-and-spend path based on estimates of current and future extinction risks, the cost effectiveness of countermeasures, and market returns. In summary, there are good reasons not to discount the benefits of extinction countermeasures. Time preference is not justifiable in intergenerational problems, there is no diminishing marginal utility from having ever existed, and uncertainties about human existence should be represented by expected values. I thus assume that the value of future lives cannot be discounted. Since this position is controversial, I later show how acceptance of discounting would affect our conclusions.

## Security

### Framework assumes the get their aff – they first must win epistemology isn’t first

### The negative is allowed to interrogate the assumptions behind the 1AC

David Grondin, Lecturer in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Quebec at Montreal, 2004, “(Re)Writing the “National Security State”: How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War”, <http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/rewriting_national_security_state.pdf>, KENTUCKY

Rethinking the Political from a Poststructuralist Stance [O]ur political imagination has been restricted by our uncritical acceptance of our own rhetorical construction of democracy, a construction that pri- vileges free-enterprise capitalism and republicanism. Such a construction – limiting, as it does, our ability to understand both ourselves and others – needs to be rhetorically reconstructed to serve the needs of globalism as different nations struggle toward their own definitions, policies, and prac- tices. The first step in such a rhetorical recons- truction is to become aware of our own language choices and the narratives and assumptions embedded in these choices (Medhurst, 2000: 16). A poststructuralist approach to international relations reassesses the nature of the political. Indeed, it calls for the repoliticization of practices of world politics that have been treated as if they were not political. For instance, limiting the ontological elements in one’s inquiry to states or great powers is a political choice. As Jenny Edkins puts it, we need to “bring the political back in” (Edkins, 1998: xii). For most analysts of International Relations, the conception of the “political” is narrowly restricted to politics as practiced by politicians. However, from a poststructuralist viewpoint, the “political” acquires a broader meaning, especially since practice is not what most theorists are describing as practice. Poststructuralism sees theoretical discourse not only as discourse, but also as political practice. Theory therefore becomes practice. The political space of poststructuralism is not that of exclusion; it is the political space of postmodernity, a dichotomous one, where one thing always signifies at least one thing and another (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 14). Poststructuralism thus gives primacy to the political, since it acts on us, while we act in its name, and leads us to identify and differentiate ourselves from others. This political act is never complete and celebrates undecidability, whereas decisions, when taken, express the political moment. It is a critical attitude which encourages dissidence from traditional approaches (Ashley and Walker, 1990a and 1990b). It does not represent one single philosophical approach or perspective, nor is it an alternative paradigm (Tvathail, 1996: 172). It is a nonplace, a border line falling between international and domestic politics (Ashley, 1989). The poststructuralist analyst questions the borderlines and dichotomies of modernist discourses, such as inside/outside, the constitution of the Self/Other, and so on. In the act of definition, difference – thereby the discourse of otherness – is highlighted, since one always defines an object with regard to what it is not (Knafo, 2004). As Simon Dalby asserts, “It involves the social construction of some other person, group, culture, race, nationality or political system as different from ‘our’ person, group, etc. Specifying difference is a linguistic, epistemological and, most importantly, a political act; it constructs a space for the other distanced and inferior from the vantage point of the person specifying the difference” (Dalby, cited in Tvathail, 1996: 179). Indeed, poststructuralism offers no definitive answers, but leads to new questions and new unexplored grounds. This makes the commitment to the incomplete nature of the political and of political analysis so central to poststructuralism (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 15). As Jim George writes, “It is postmodern resistance in the sense that while it is directly (and sometimes violently) engaged with modernity, it seeks to go beyond the repressive, closed aspects of modernist global existence. It is, therefore, not a resistance of traditional grand-scale emancipation or conventional radicalism imbued with authority of one or another sovereign presence. Rather, in opposing the large-scale brutality and inequity in human society, it is a resistance active also at the everyday, com- munity, neighbourhood, and interpersonal levels, where it confronts those processes that systematically exclude people from making decisions about who they are and what they can be” (George, 1994: 215, emphasis in original). In this light, poststructural practices are used critically to investigate how the subject of international relations is constituted in and through the discourses and texts of global politics. Treating theory as discourse opens up the possibility of historicizing it. It is a myth that theory can be abstracted from its socio-historical context, from reality, so to speak, as neorealists and neoclassical realists believe. It is a political practice which needs to be contextualized and stripped of its purportedly neutral status. It must be understood with respect to its role in preserving and reproducing the structures and power relations present in all language forms. Dominant theories are, in this view, dominant discourses that shape our view of the world (the “subject”) and our ways of understanding it. Given my poststructuralist inclinations, I do not subscribe to the positivistic social scientific enterprise which aspires to test hypotheses against the “real world”. I therefore reject epistemological empiricism. Since epistemology is closely intertwined with methodology, especially with positivism, I eschew naturalism as a methodology. I study discourses and discursive practices that take shape in texts. This does not mean that there is no material world as such, only that it must be understood as mediated by language, which in the end means that it is always interpreted once framed by discourse (through the spoken word or in written form).2 “A discourse, then, is not a way of learning ‘about’ something out there in the ‘real world’; it is rather a way of producing that some- thing as real, as identifiable, classifiable, knowable, and therefore, meaningful. Discourse creates the conditions of knowing” (Klein quoted in George, 1994: 30). We consider “real” what we consider significant: a discourse is always an interpretation, a narrative of multiple realities inscribed in a specific social or symbolic order. Discursive representation is therefore not neutral; individuals in power are those who are “authorized” to produce “reality”, and therefore, knowledge. In this context, power is knowledge and the ability to produce that which is considered “true”. A realist discourse will produce the socio- linguistic conditions that will allow it to correspond, in theory as in practice, to “reality”. Evidently, this “reality” will be nothing but the “realist discourse” that one has constituted oneself. This is why, from a poststructuralist perspective, discourse may be considered as ontology3. Language is an autonomous system in which intertextuality makes many inter- pretations possible. Intertextuality, as Roland Barthes explains it, celebrates the “death of the author”: it is not the author who speaks, but the text, by referring to other texts, through the reader’s mind.4 The meaning of a text is thus enacted by the reader instead of being articulated passively in the text. Intertextuality assumes that a text can be read only in relation to other texts, as an “intertext”. The reader will read the text by virtually reinterpreting texts he already read in light of this new text. Such an intertextual approach thus allows endless interpretations and readings: “[...] as relevant as sources are, the list of unknowable sources that inform a reader’s interpretation of a text is what makes inter- textuality a powerful social and personal experience” (Porcel, 2002: 150). Intertextuality and deconstruction are used in a complementary way. “Decons- truction ‘is’ a way of reading a particular text, in which it is demonstrated that the ‘author’ fails to produce the logical, rational, construction of thought that was intended” (Brown, 1994: 1665). It is not a testable theory, nor a standard method; it is an ongoing ‘project’ (Butler, 2002: 28). It produces “stories”, not “theories”. In effect, in deconstruction, binary oppositions encoded in language and hierarchical antinomies hidden in discourse are revealed. It is thus assumed that the meaning of a concept can be revealed only in relation to at least one other term. Deconstructing American Hegemonic Realist Discourses5 [S]ecurity studies can be understood as a series of discursive practices that provided the policy coordination that went with incorporation into the U.S. political sphere (Dalby, 1997: 19). In explaining national security conduct, realist discourses serve the violent6 purposes of the state, as well as legitimizing its actions and reinforcing its hegemony. This is why we must historicize the practice of the analyst and question the “regimes of truth” constructed by realist discourses. When studying a given discourse, one must also study the socio-historical conditions in which it was produced. Realist analysts are part of the subfield of Strategic Studies associated with the Cold War era. Even though it faced numerous criticisms after the Cold War, especially since it proved irrelevant in predicting its end, this subfield retains a significant influence in International Relations – as evidenced, for instance, by the vitality of the journal International Security. Theoretically speaking, Strategic Studies is the field par excellence of realist analyses: it is a way of interpreting the world, which is inscribed in the language of violence, organized in strategy, in military planning, in a military order, and which seek to shape and preserve world order (Klein, 1994: 14). Since they are interested in issues of international order, realist discourses study the balancing and bandwagoning behavior of great powers. Realist analysts believe they can separate object from subject: on this view, it would be possible to abstract oneself from the world in which one lives and studies and to use value-free discourse to produce a non-normative analysis. As Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth assert, “[s]uch arguments [about American moderation and inter- national benevolence that stress the constraints on American power] are unpersuasive, however, because they fail to acknowledge the true nature of the current international system” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 31). Thus it would seem that Brooks and Wohlforth have the ability to “know” essential “truths”, as they “know” the “true” nature of the international system. From this vantage point it would even be possible “to set aside one’s own subjective biases and values and to confront the world on its own terms, with the hope of gaining mastery of that world through a clear understanding that transcends the limits of such personal determinants as one’s own values, class, gender, race, or emotions” (Klein, 1994: 16). However, it is impossible to speak or write from a neutral or transcendental ground: “there are only interpretations – some stronger and some weaker, to be sure – based on argument and evidence, which seems from the standpoint of the interpreter and his or her interlocutor to be ‘right’ or ‘accurate’ or ‘useful’ at the moment of interpretation” (Medhurst, 2000: 10). It is in such realist discourse that Strategic Studies become a technocratic approach determining the foundations of security policies that are disguised as an academic approach above all critical reflection (Klein, 1994: 27-28). Committed to an explanatory logic, realist analysts are less interested in the constitutive processes of states and state systems than in their functional existence, which they take as given. They are more attentive to regulation, through the military uses of force and strategic practices that establish the internal and external boundaries of the states system. Their main argument is that matters of security are the immutable driving forces of global politics. Indeed, most realists see some strategic lessons as being eternal, such as balance of power politics and the quest for national security. For Brooks and Wohlforth, balance of power politics (which was synonymous with Cold War politics in realist discourses) is the norm: “The result — balancing that is rhetorically grand but substan- tively weak — is politics as usual in a unipolar world” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 29). National security discourses constitute the “observed realities” that are the grist of neorealist and neoclassical realist theories. These theories rely upon U.S. material power (the perception of U.S. relative material power for neoclassical realists), balance of power, and the global distribution of power to explain and legitimate American national security conduct. Their argument is circular since they depict a reality that is constituted by their own discourse, in addition to legitimizing American strategic behavior. Realists often disagree about the use of force – on military restraint versus military intervention, for example – but the differences pertain to strategies of power, that is, means as opposed to ends. Realist discourses will not challenge the United States’ position as a prominent military power. As Barry Posen maintains, “[o]ne pillar of U.S. hegemony is the vast military power of the United States. [...] Observers of the actual capabilities that this effort produces can focus on a favorite aspect of U.S. superiority to make the point that the United States sits comfortably atop the military food chain, and is likely to remain there” (Posen, 2003: 7). Realist analysts “observe” that the U.S. is the world hegemonic power and that no other state can balance that power. In their analyses, they seek to explain how the United States was able to build and lead coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq with no other power capable of offering military resistance. Barry Posen “neutrally” explains this by em- phasizing the United States’ permanent preparation for war: I argue that the United States enjoys command of the commons—command of the sea, space, and air. I discuss how command of the commons supports a hegemonic grand strategy. [...] Command means that the United States gets vastly more military use out of the sea, space, and air than do others; that it can credibly threaten to deny their use to others; and that others would lose a military contest for the commons if they attempted to deny them to the United States. Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the U.S. global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power, including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the commons has permitted the United States to wage war on short notice even where it has had little permanent military presence. This was true of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the 1993 intervention in Somalia, and the 2001 action in Afghanistan (Posen, 2003: 7-9). Moreover, in realist theoretical discourses, transnational non-state actors such as terrorist networks are not yet taken into account. According to Brooks and Wohlforth, they need not be: “Today there is one pole in a system in which the population has trebled to nearly 200” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 29). In their system, only states are relevant. And what of the Al-Qaida terrorist network? At best, realist discourses accommodate an interstate framework, a “reality” depicted in their writings as an oversimplification of the complex world in which we now live (Kratochwil, 2000).7 In their theoretical constructs, these analysts do not address national or state identity in any substantive way. Moreover, they do not pay attention to the security culture in which they as individuals are embedded8. They rarely if ever acknowledge their subjectivity as analysts, and they proceed as if they were able to separate themselves from their cultural environment. From a poststructuralist perspective, however, it is impossible to recognize all the ways in which we have been shaped by the culture and environment in which we were raised. We can only think or experience the world through a cultural prism: it is impossible to abstract oneself from one’s interpretive cultural context and experience and describe “the world as it is”. There is always an interpretive dimension to knowledge, an inevitable mediation between the “real world” and its representation. This is why American realist analysts have trouble shedding the Cold War mentality in which they were immersed. Yet some scholars, like Brooks and Wohlforth, consciously want to perpetuate it: “Today the costs and dangers of the Cold War have faded into history, but they need to be kept in mind in order to assess unipolarity accurately” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 30). The Language of Realism(s) What is at issue is how to deal appropriately with always already being part of a reality that cannot be described or grasped other than through inter- pretations and in relation to our practices, which are at the same time constituting it (Maja Zehfuss, 2002: 255). Neorealist and neoclassical realism offer themselves up as a narrative of the world institutional order. Critical approaches must therefore seek to countermemorialize “those whose lives and voices have been variously silenced in the process of strategic practices” (Klein, 1994: 28). The problem, as revealed in the debate between gatekeepers of the subfield of Strategic Studies (Walt, 1991), is that those analyses that contravene the dominant discourse are deemed insignificant by virtue of their differing ontological and epistemological foundations. Approaches that deconstruct theoretical practices in order to disclose what is hidden in the use of concepts such as “national security” have something valuable to say. Their more reflexive and critically-inclined view illustrates how terms used in realist discourses, such as state, anarchy, world order, revolution in military affairs, and security dilemmas, are produced by a specific historical, geographical and socio-political context as well as historical forces and social relations of power (Klein, 1994: 22). Since realist analysts do not question their ontology and yet purport to provide a neutral and objective analysis of a given world order based on military power and interactions between the most important political units, namely states, realist discourses constitute a political act in defense of the state. Indeed, “[...] it is important to recognize that to employ a textualizing approach to social policy involving conflict and war is not to attempt to reduce social phenomena to various concrete manifestations of language. Rather, it is an attempt to analyze the interpretations governing policy thinking. And it is important to recognize that policy thinking is not unsituated” (Shapiro, 1989a: 71). Policy thinking is practical thinking since it imposes an analytic order on the “real world”, a world that only exists in the analysts’ own narratives. In this light, Barry Posen’s political role in legitimizing American hegemonic power and national security conduct seems obvious: U.S. command of the commons provides an impressive foundation for selective engagement. It is not adequate for a policy of primacy. [...] Command of the commons gives the United States a tremendous capability to harm others. Marrying that capability to a conservative policy of selective engagement helps make U.S. military power appear less threatening and more tolerable. Command of the commons creates additional collective goods for U.S. allies. These collective goods help connect U.S. military power to seemingly prosaic welfare concerns. U.S. military power underwrites world trade, travel, global telecommunications, and commercial remote sensing, which all depend on peace and order in the commons” (Posen, 2003: 44 and 46). Adopting a more critical stance, David Campbell points out that “[d]anger is not an objective condition. It (sic) is not a thing which exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. [...] Nothing is a risk in itself; [...] it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event” (Campbell, 1998: 1-2). In the same vein, national security discourse does not evaluate objective threats; rather, it is itself a product of historical processes and structures in the state and society that produces it. Whoever has the power to define security is then the one who has the authority to write legitimate security discourses and conduct the policies that legitimize them. The realist analysts and state leaders who invoke national security and act in its name are the same individuals who hold the power to securitize threats by inserting them in a discourse that frames national identity and freezes it.9 Like many concepts, realism is essentially contested. In a critical reinterpretation of realism, James Der Derian offers a genealogy of realism that deconstructs the uniform realism represented in IR: he reveals many other versions of realism that are never mentioned in International Relations texts (Der Derian, 1995: 367). I am aware that there are many realist discourses in International Relations, but they all share a set of assumptions, such as “the state is a rational unitary actor”, “the state is the main actor in international relations”, “states pursue power defined as a national interest”, and so on. I want to show that realism is one way of representing reality, not the reflection of reality. While my aim here is not to rehearse Der Derian’s genealogy of realism, I do want to spell out the problems with a positivist theory of realism and a correspondence philosophy of language. Such a philosophy accepts nominalism, wherein language as neutral description corresponds to reality. This is precisely the problem of epistemic realism and of the realism characteristic of American realist theoretical discourses. And since for poststructuralists language constitutes reality, a reinterpretation of realism as constructed in these discourses is called for.10 These scholars cannot refer to the “essentially contested nature of realism” and then use “realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon” (Der Derian, 1995: 374). Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that the many neorealist and neoclassical realist discourses in International Relations are not useful. Rather, I want to argue that these technicist and scientist forms of realism serve political purposes, used as they are in many think tanks and foreign policy bureaucracies to inform American political leaders. This is the relevance of deconstructing the uniform realism (as used in International Relations): it brings to light its locatedness in a hermeneutic circle in which it is unwittingly trapped (Der Derian, 1995: 371). And as Friedrich Kratochwil argues, “[...] the rejection of a correspondence theory of truth does not condemn us, as it is often maintained, to mere ‘relativism’ and/or to endless “deconstruction” in which anything goes but it leaves us with criteria that allows us to distinguish and evaluate competing theoretical creations” (Kratochwil, 2000 : 52). Given that political language is not a neutral medium that gives expression to ideas formed independently of structures of signification that sustain political action and thought, American realist discourses belonging to the neorealist or neoclassical realist traditions cannot be taken as mere descriptions of reality. We are trapped in the production of discourses in which national leaders and security speech acts emanating from realist discourses develop and reinforce a notion of national identity as synony- mous with national security. U.S. national security conduct should thus be understood through the prism of the theoretical discourses of American political leaders and realist scholars that co-constitute it. Realist discourses depict American political leaders acting in defense of national security, and political leaders act in the name of national security. In the end, what distinguishes realist discourses is that they depict the United States as having behaved like a national security state since World War II, while legitimating the idea that the United States should continue to do so. Political scientists and historians “are engaged in making (poesis), not merely recording or reporting” (Medhurst, 2000: 17). Precisely in this sense, rhetoric is not the description of national security conduct; it constitutes it. Writing the National Security State [F]rom the giddy days of the first and through the most morbid moments of the Second Cold War, the popular culture, journalism, and academic study of international intrigue has been an important inter- text of power and play in world politics. This intertext represents a field of ideological contestation where national security strategies, with their end- games of impossibly real wars of mass annihilation can be played and replayed for mass consumption as a simulation of war in which states compete, in- terests clash, and spy counters spy, all in significant fun (Der Derian, 1992: 41). It is difficult to trace the exact origins of the concept of “national security”. It seems however that its currency in policymaking circles corresponds to the American experience of the Second World War and of the early years of what came to be known as the “Cold War”. In this light, it is fair to say that the meaning of the American national security state is bound up with the Cold War context. If one is engaged in deciphering the meaning of the Cold War prism for American leaders, what matters is not uncovering the “reality” of the Cold War as such, but how, it conferred meaning and led people to act upon it as “reality”. The Cold War can thus be seen as a rhetorical construction, in which its rhetorical dimensions gave meaning to its material manifestations, such as the national security state apparatus. This is not to say that the Cold War never existed per se, nor does it “make [it] any less real or less significant for being rhetorical” (Medhurst, 2000: 6). As Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. stress, “political rhetoric creates political reality, structures belief systems, and provides the fundamental bases for decisions” (Hinds and Windt, cited in Medhurst, 2000: 6). In this sense, the Cold War ceases to be a historical period which meaning can be written permanently and becomes instead a struggle that is not context-specific and not geared towards one specific enemy. It is “an orientation towards difference in which those acting on behalf of an assumed but never fixed identity are tempted by the lure of otherness to interpret all dangers as fundamental threats which require the mobilization of a population” (Campbell, 2000: 227). Indeed, if the meaning of the Cold War is not context-specific, the concept of national security cannot be disconnected from what is known as the Cold War, since its very meaning(s) emerged within it (Rosenberg, 1993 : 277).11 If the American national security state is a given for realist analysts,12 it is important to ask whether we can conceive the United States during the Cold War as anything other than a national security state.13 To be clear, I am not suggesting that there is any such essentialized entity as a “national security state”.14 When I refer to the American national security state, I mean the representation of the American state in the early years of the Cold War, the spirit of which is embodied in the National Security Act of 1947 (Der Derian, 1992: 76). The term “national security state” designates both an institutionalization of a new governmental architecture designed to prepare the United States politically and militarily to face any foreign threat and the ideology – the discourse – that gave rise to as well as symbolized it. In other words, to understand the idea of a national security state, one needs to grasp the discursive power of national security in shaping the reality of the Cold War in both language and institutions (Rosenberg, 1993 : 281). A national security state feeds on threats as it channels all its efforts into meeting current and future military or security threats. The creation of the CIA, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council at the onset of the Cold War gave impetus to a state mentality geared to permanent preparedness for war. The construction of threats is thus essential to its well-being, making intelligence agencies privileged tools in accom- plishing this task. As American historian of U.S. foreign relations Michael Hogan observes in his study on the rise of the national security state during the Truman administration, “the national security ideology framed the Cold War discourse in a system of symbolic representation that defined America’s national identity by reference to the un-American ‘other,’ usually the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or some other totalitarian power” (Hogan, 1998: 17) Such a binary system made it difficult for any domestic dissent from U.S. policy to emerge – it would have “amounted to an act of disloyalty” (Hogan, 1998: 18).15 While Hogan distinguishes advocates from critics of the American national security state, his view takes for granted that there is a given and fixed American political culture that differs from the “new” national security ideology. It posits an “American way”, produced by its cultural, political, and historical experience. Although he stresses that differences between the two sides of the discourse are superficial, pertaining solely to the means, rather than the ends of the national security state, Hogan sees the national security state as a finished and legitimate state: an American state suited to the Cold War context of permanent war, while stopping short of a garrison state: Although government would grow larger, taxes would go up, and budget deficits would become a matter of routine, none of these and other transformations would add up to the crushing regime symbolized in the metaphor of the garrison state. The outcome instead would be an American national security state that was shaped as much by the country’s democratic political culture as it was by the perceived military imperatives of the Cold War (Hogan, 1998: 22). I disagree with this essentialist view of the state identity of the United States. The United States does not need to be a national security state. If it was and is still constructed as such by many realist discourses, it is because these discourses serve some political purpose. Moreover, in keeping with my poststructuralist inclinations, I maintain that identity need not be, and indeed never is, fixed. In a scheme in which “to say is to do”, that is, from a perspective that accepts the performativity of language, culture becomes a relational site where identity politics happens rather than being a substantive phenomenon. In this sense, culture is not simply a social context framing foreign policy decision-making. Culture is “a signifying part of the conditions of possibility for social being, [...] the way in which culturalist arguments themselves secure the identity of subjects in whose name they speak” (Campbell, 1998: 221). The Cold War national security culture represented in realist discourses was constitutive of the American national security state. There was certainly a conflation of theory and policy in the Cold War military-intellectual complex, which “were observers of, and active participants in, defining the meaning of the Cold War. They contributed to portray the enemy that both reflected and fueled predominant ideological strains within the American body politic. As scholarly partners in the national security state, they were instrumental in defining and disseminating a Cold War culture” (Rubin, 2001: 15). This national security culture was “a complex space where various representations and representatives of the national security state compete to draw the boundaries and dominate the murkier margins of international relations” (Der Derian, 1992: 41). The same Cold War security culture has been maintained by political practice (on the part of realist analysts and political leaders) through realist discourses in the post-9/11 era and once again reproduces the idea of a national security state. This (implicit) state identification is neither accidental nor inconsequential. From a poststructuralist vantage point, the identification process of the state and the nation is always a negative process for it is achieved by exclusion, violence, and margina- lization. Thus, a deconstruction of practices that constitute and consolidate state identity is necessary: the writing of the state must be revealed through the analysis of the discourses that constitute it. The state and the discourses that (re)constitute it thus frame its very identity and impose a fictitious “national unity” on society; it is from this fictive and arbitrary creation of the modernist dichotomous discourses of inside/outside that the discourses (re)constructing the state emerge. It is in the creation of a Self and an Other in which the state uses it monopolistic power of legitimate violence – a power socially constructed, following Max Weber’s work on the ethic of responsibility – to construct a threatening Other differentiated from the “unified” Self, the national society (the nation).16 It is through this very practice of normative statecraft,17 which produces threatening Others, that the international sphere comes into being. David Campbell adds that it is by constantly articulating danger through foreign policy that the state’s very conditions of existence are generated18. Rewriting the National Security State If realists are now easily caricatured, they have only themselves to blame. They had become caricatures by their own self-description. Realism, and parti- cularly its offshoot, strategic studies, helped make and was made by the Cold War (Booth, 1997: 92). Much of the Cold War state apparatus and military infrastructure remained in place to meet the challenges and threats of the post-Cold War era. If the attack on Pearl Harbor was the driving force of the postwar national security state apparatus (Stuart, 2003: 303), the 9/11 events have been used as a motive for resurrecting the national security discourse as a justification against a new ‘infamy’, global terrorism.19 Although in this study I am calling into question the political practices that legitimized the very idea of a national security state during the Cold War era, I find even more problematic the reproduction of a similar logic in the post-9/11 era – a rather different historical and socio-political context. As Simon Dalby highlights, Coupling fears of Soviet ambitions, of a repeat of Pearl Harbor, and of nuclear war, these institutions formed the heart of a semipermanent military mobilization to support the policies of containment militarism. If this context is no longer applicable, the case that the national security state is not an appropriate mode for social organization in the future is in many ways compelling. If security is pre- mised on violence, as security-dilemma and national-security literatures suggest (albeit often reluctantly), perhaps the necessity of rethinking global politics requires abandoning the term and the conceptual strictures that go with it (Dalby, 1997: 21). A recent article by David Jablonsky in the U.S. Army War College’s journal Para- meters illustrates such an un-problematized view of a Cold War-like attitude of casting for new enemies and threats, such as global terrorism, that can justify a state of permanent war (Luke, 2002: 10): In those early years of the Cold War, American leaders fashioned a grand strategic vision of the US role in the world, which while innovative in terms of changing concept of national security, did not outrun the experiences of the American people as the Soviet threat unfolded. US leaders face a similar challenge today as they seek to educate the public that the domestic terrorist threat to physical security should not be allowed to skew the American grand strategy of global engagement designed to further that core interest as well as those of economic prosperity and value promotion. [...] The new threat assures the continued existence if not growth of the national security state and will certainly cause increased centralization and intrusiveness of the US government. Nevertheless, the Cold War demonstrates that all this need not cause the rise of a garrison state or the diminishment of civil liberties (Jablonsky, 2003: 18). What puzzles me is that this viewpoint reflects an unquestioned normative statecraft practice that might be seen not only as possible but “wise”, since “we” all know that, in the end, the Cold War led to an “American triumph”... From a critical standpoint, national security discourse is constitutive of “social reality”: it is not neutral and it often serves to outfit state actions as objective responses to socio-political problems. U.S. state leaders now use this same discourse – the national security discourse – to wage a global war on ter- rorism. As Keith Shimko aptly points out, Times of war are no normal times. In addition to being periods of focused effort and all-out expenditure, ‘wartime’ might also be viewed as a period when some of the normal luxuries of life (e.g., material comfort or political liberties) are ‘sacrificed’ to the war effort. As a result, framing an issue as a war could lead to calls for restrictions on behavior and rights that are typically protected but come to be viewed as unaffordable luxuries during wartime (Shimko, 1995:79). The U.S. response to 9/11 is encapsulated as an armed struggle against a phantom enemy who replicates the tactics used in guerrilla wars in its capacity to strike any time, anywhere. The enemy is thus constructed as being both everywhere and nowhere, which allows state leaders to enact a security discourse of an Other against whom the U.S. must be protected as a legitimate and necessary one at the expense of some civil rights (e.g., colour tags for travellers and fingerprint biometric sensors in passports). A “state of war” is indeed incorporated into American political life : “For a society committed to armed struggle, there is little distinction between military and civilian life. ‘The cause’ becomes everything, justifying extraordinary measures, demanding larger-than-life sacrifices. Ordinary life is recruited into the ruthless binary that frames the struggle [...]. There is no room for a loyal opposition; to question is to betray” (Milner, Krishna, and Ferguson, 2001). In the context of a global war on terrorism, every citizen may become a “terrorist”. As Ronnie Lipschutz argues in After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, “[a]ll individuals, whether citizen or permanent resident, whether legal or illegal, become potential threats to state security” (Lipschtuz, 2000: 51). Surprisingly, not many American citizens contested or protested such undemocratic limitations on civil liberties. Why is that so? One possible answer is that a great many are convinced that such measures will not be applied to them and that their own rights and freedoms will not be threatened. They seem to believe that since they are not doing anything wrong, they are protected. Accordingly, they think that those whose privacy and rights are being violated have done 19 20 something wrong and that they deserve it. As Iris Marion Young explains, this is where they err, for “[t]he move from a relatively free society to one over which the state exercises authoritarian domination often occurs by means of just this logic: citizens do not realize how easily they may find themselves under suspicion by authorities over whose decisions there is no public scrutiny” (Young, 2003: 12). When societal and individual security is considered, the national security discourse produces more insecurity than security.20 We must therefore question state practices that threaten individuals, rendering the state a source of insecurity for its citizens : “[I]nsecurity, rather than being external to the object to which it presents a threat is both implicated in and an effect of the very process of establishing and re-establishing the object’s identity” (Jutta Weldes, cited in Willey, 2002 : 29). National insecurity is thus revealed as the clear antonym of national security (Rosenberg, 1993 : 281 ; Der Derian, 1992: 75). Linguistically, “national insecurity” corresponds to the female and weak side of Cold War discourses (Tickner, 2001: 52 ; Peterson, 1992: 32). In effect, as Emily Rosenberg correctly observes, the power of national security linguistically comes from this binary opposition, where national security is empowered as representing a “strong emotive and symbolic power” inscribed in the male national security statist discourse (Rosenberg, 1993: 281). The national security state thus functions as a protection racket. Consequently, whether looking inward or outward, it must be rejected for its very discourse necessarily entails the unequal logic of protector- protected (Young, 2003: 14-15, 21). To understand American hegemonic power then is to understand how the theoretical foundations of U.S. hegemony influence the way U.S. leaders think about international politics generally and U.S. foreign policy in particular. As Marysia Zalewski points out, “[...] events in the world, issues in international politics, are not ontologically prior to our theories about them. This does not mean that people read about, say realism, and act accordingly, but that our (and by ‘our’ I mean theoriser/ global actors) dominant ways of thinking and acting in the world will be (re)produced as ‘reality’” (Zalewski, 1996: 350-51). The 9/11 attacks and the presence of a diffuse and transnational terrorist threat has convinced American state leaders that threats may come from within as well as from abroad. In a Cold War-like national security mindset, separating domestic from international politics was “business as usual”: it required paying attention to foreign and external threats. With a homeland security focus, the “boundaries” of the national security state are exploding inwardly. The “enemy” is not a foreign Other anymore; he may be American or he may strike on American soil. As Donald Pease puts it, “Overall, 9/11 brought to the light of day the Other to the normative representation of the United States. It positioned unheimlich dislocatees within the Homeland in place of the citizens who exercised rights and liberties on the basis of these normalizations. When the signifier of the Homeland substituted for the Virgin Land, the national security state was supplanted by the global state of emergency” (Pease, 2003: 17). The Other has become an undefined terrorist, with no specific territorial base. Just as Soviet communists were represented as barbaric, amoral, and inhuman, so is today’s terrorist. Conclusion [B]ecause invoking security is a political act and the discourses that construct dangers and endan- gered subjects are far from natural or neutral reflections of an independent reality, the larger social and political contexts within such discourses are invoked should also be given analytical attention (Dalby, 2002: XXI). In this piece, I have sought to explain how (American) realist theoretical discourses are mainly representative of the American experience of the Cold War. I have treated these historically-based discourses as political practices that frame and reproduce a national security state identity for the United States in the post-9/11 era. It is not the “reality” of the United States as a state that is cast in question by poststructuralists, but rather the way it is written as an unchanging and essentialized entity, as a national security state identity. Indeed, a state is always in the process of (re)construction; its identity is never fixed, nor is its legitimacy uncontested. As Campbell puts it, “with no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming” (Campbell, 1998: 12). The poststructuralist approach adopted here made it possible to reveal the normative issues arising in such discourses. In sum, to understand how American or American-based realist discourses facilitated the social construction of a Cold War with the USSR after World War II, one must understand the security culture that allowed for the development of political practices that ushered in the institutionalization of a national security state. On a more metatheoretical level, in International Relations, the poststructuralist/ postmodernist turn has made mainstream positivist scholars fear a lapse into complete relativism. As Christopher Butler points out, “Postmodernist relativism needn’t meant that anything goes. [...] What it does mean is that we should be more sceptically aware, more relativist about, more attentive to, the theoretical assumptions which support the narratives produced by all [scholars] (in the original quote, Butler wrote “historians” for he was addressing historians), whether they see themselves as empiricists or deconstructors or as postmodernist ‘new historicists’” (Butler, 2002: 35). It is increasingly clear that realists of all guises in International Relations are more and more reluctant to take an inflexible position with respect to the ontological and epistemological assumptions underpinning the discipline. However, in viewing theory as practice, we recognize that our choices have a normative and political value which allows us to distinguish the important from the incidental. As a result, what people see as the “real world” is implicitly bound up with the epistemological, methodological and ontological stance they take in theoretical discourse. If the national security discourse that made the Cold War possible – in American realist discourses at least – is (re)applied to our own era, then a similar pattern of legitimizing and constituting a national security state will be reproduced.

### Education – the roll of the scholar is to question methodology first – securitized methodology is unethical

Shampa Biswas 7 Prof of Politics @ Whitman “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist” Millennium 36 (1) p. 117-125

The recent resuscitation of the project of Empire should give International Relations scholars particular pause.1 For a discipline long premised on a triumphant Westphalian sovereignty, there should be something remarkable about the ease with which the case for brute force, regime change and empire-building is being formulated in widespread commentary spanning the political spectrum. Writing after the 1991 Gulf War, Edward Said notes the US hesitance to use the word ‘empire’ despite its long imperial history.2 This hesitance too is increasingly under attack as even self-designated liberal commentators such as Michael Ignatieff urge the US to overcome its unease with the ‘e-word’ and selfconsciously don the mantle of imperial power, contravening the limits of sovereign authority and remaking the world in its universalist image of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.3 Rashid Khalidi has argued that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq does indeed mark a new stage in American world hegemony, replacing the indirect and proxy forms of Cold War domination with a regime much more reminiscent of European colonial empires in the Middle East.4 The ease with which a defence of empire has been mounted and a colonial project so unabashedly resurrected makes this a particularly opportune, if not necessary, moment, as scholars of ‘the global’, to take stock of our disciplinary complicities with power, to account for colonialist imaginaries that are lodged at the heart of a discipline ostensibly interested in power but perhaps far too deluded by the formal equality of state sovereignty and overly concerned with security and order. Perhaps more than any other scholar, Edward Said’s groundbreaking work in Orientalism has argued and demonstrated the long and deep complicity of academic scholarship with colonial domination.5 In addition to spawning whole new areas of scholarship such as postcolonial studies, Said’s writings have had considerable influence in his own discipline of comparative literature but also in such varied disciplines as anthropology, geography and history, all of which have taken serious and sustained stock of their own participation in imperial projects and in fact regrouped around that consciousness in a way that has simply not happened with International Relations.6 It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced, resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine the contours of global power. Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence render questionable the disciplinary traps that have, ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholars whose very business it is to think about global politics to actually think globally and politically. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking politics seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the global seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about feeling and thinking globally concretely, thoroughly and carefully. IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’ One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply not be raised. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

#### Threats of production are constructed to justify the sovereign state

Marcus Ehn Handledare: Urban Strandberg, 2010, “Energy and the concept of security”, Doc, KENTUCKY

The economic sector of security is based upon on the relationship between “the political structure of anarchy and the economic structure of the market” (Buzan et al., 1998, p95). Mercantilists put the politics on the forefront where as liberals put economics first. The liberal ideal is the attrition of national economies with their possible restrictions on the movement of goods and services (Buzan et al., 1998, p96). The discourse of economic security therefore focuses on threats towards the liberal agenda of free trade and the emergence of doubt regarding the stability of the market which could disrupt the flow of goods. Specifically concerning if the dependencies made apparent through the process of globalization could be exploited for political ends and if this can manifest itself through concern regarding security of supply when referent objects abandon the idea of self-reliance (Buzan et al., 1998, p97-98). The liberal idea behind for instance the EU was that through the process of interdependence no one nation would be able to independently mobilize or use trade as a political weapon. Concerning the speech act the most apparent way of using securitization in regards to the economic sector is to point to the possible collapse of welfare for the referent object which in turn can lead to social unrest and eventually a breakdown of society (Buzan et al., 1998, p102). In the economic sector states are actors with the greatest possibility of securitizing an issue by pointing towards a threat against what can be seen as its basic needs. If the state is not self-reliant upon all of its resources needed to maintain its societal structure, and the supply of one of these resources is threatened, then the state can clearly and legitimately securitize an issue (Buzan et al., 1998, p105). For instance the EU can be threatened existentially by something which threatens its process of interdependence through its construction of the single market. The key issue in the economic sector is the stable supply of goods which means the fluctuations in supply and demand are kept within certain limits and thereby preventing price shocks such as the oil crisis. Protectionism can thereby for instance be seen as an existential threat towards the stability of the market. Ways of combating this can be increasing institutional checks and balances which manage fluctuations in the demand and supply of goods (Buzan et al., 1998, p107). The societal sector of security aim differs from the traditional state view as a referent object and instead focuses on the dynamics of the nation. Whereas political security focuses on the role of the state, societal security takes into account the fact that throughout history there have rarely been homogenous national states (although this also applies to heterogeneous states). In the security analysis regarding the societal sector the key question concerns identity. In this case the securitization takes place when an incident potentially could threaten the community and its identity (Buzan et al., 1998, p119). Usually the collective identity of the community creates a sense of us versus them in regards to the threat. When the nation is closely connected to the state, this speech act is often executed by high ranking officials of the government (Buzan et al., 1998, p123). The identity in question could for instance feel threatened by what they perceive is the cultural imperialism of the west on its intrinsic values (Buzan et al., 1998, p137).

#### The alternative does solve – our approach is multiviarble and re-orients our understanding of geopolitics via accounts of identity, culture, and ethnicity, rejecting the affirmative’s static notions of IR - the 1AC is orthodox only seeing the world as a chess board where pieces must move certain ways – the problem is when the pieces don’t move how they want they throw the board against the wall – its try or die – the alternative is feasible

Lal 08 (Prerna P., J.D. Candidate at George Washington Law School, Critical Security Studies, “Deconstructing the National Security State: Towards a New Framework of Analysis,” POSC 4910: Senior Seminar, <http://prernalal.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/css-deconstructing-the-nat-sec-state.pdf>) KENTUCKY

Four years later, amidst the deaths of countless many civilians, a soaring budget deficit, numerous accounts of human rights violations, and the continued rise of “terrorist” networks in many more countries, the “war on terror” is steadily losing support, yet the leaders of the United States continue to carpet bomb Middle-Eastern nations with no end in sight. Hence, it has become critically important to question and reassess the dominant articulation of security as presented by the national security state. This dominant articulation is realism, which has imposed an image of reality upon people that is unrealistic; an image that has been composed and constantly reconsidered, acting as a tool for statist identity construction and economic elites. For the purpose of this paper, all mentions of realism from hereon refers to neo-realism, which is an ideology that presupposes the existence of objective truth and assumes that political conflict and war is a result of the anarchic nature of the international system, where nation-states have to constantly fight to defend their boundaries. In an increasingly complex world, filled with a multitude of different cultures, languages, states and peoples, the traditional neo- realist view of national security is problematic. The problems with realism are many, starting with the fact that (neo)-realism is a misnomer for it is unrealistic and fails to grasp how the world really works. In fact, it is a problem veiled as a problem-solver, wearing the false cloak of objectivity and truth. It assumes that objective truth and knowledge exists independent of our minds; however, the world is not free from our perceptions. As Anais Nin (2005, 5) points out in Critical Security Studies and World Politics, “we do not see things as they are, we see things as we are.” In this case, the “we” are the rulers of the American nation-state, who tout realism as objective truth, in order to create a world more favorable to them. Those with an ideology of domination and an economic interest to dictate, define our reality in terms of their interests. In fact, the construction of this reality is so pervasive that we do not see realism as an ideology, but as a self-evident truth. To accept this constructed reality without questioning is dangerous, for all ideology serves a purpose, and in this case, neo- realism serves the purpose of the state and its elites. Realism also has a narrow and statist agenda that fails to cope with the actual threats to human society. Kenneth Booth (2005, 7), a self-proclaimed fallen realist and head of the Department of International Relations at University of Wales, argues in Critical Security Studies and World Politics that realism offers a massive but narrow agenda, which is “based on the perceived interests of states (and therefore of their elites); this so-called national interest is concerned with maximizing state security, maximizing economic well-being, and protecting the state’s way of life.” Moreover, judging by the high levels of human insecurity that still exists in this world, it is safe to say that realism is a failure for it has empirically failed to deliver security. The threats to human security, which include war, disease, famines, crime, ethnic and religious persecution, violence against women, environmental degradation and so on, take a back-seat because realist notions of security are state-centric. This exclusive lens of international relations is downright regressive for it silences dissidents and minority populations. Women, racial and ethnic minorities, progressives, the working class and their concerns are absent from the realist security agenda. Consequently, an alternative view that questions the dominant paradigm of realism and realist notions of security is desperately needed to provide for human security and emancipation. Methodology: Critical Security Studies The Critical Security Studies (CSS) approach to international relations challenges realism and performatively proves that security is a paradoxical, epistemologically flawed and ontologically unstable concept with no fixed definition. A branch of critical theory, CSS is a broad and diverse field with theorists ranging from critical realists to poststructuralists. However, it is united in its criticism of the neo-realist framework of security, which shall be presented later. Perhaps, Robert Cox (1981, 208) comes closest to discerning the difference between the “realist” problem-solving approach to international relations and critical theory in “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” when he states that the former takes “prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized...as the given framework of action,” while the latter “calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing.” Thus, Critical Security Studies is an unorthodox and questioning outlook to the dominant social and power structure, institutions, and ideologies. Another component of critical theory that differs from realism is that critical theory recognizes “change, the openness of history, and the unfinished nature of the human experiment” (Booth 2005, 12). Therefore, while Critical Security Studies questions prevailing structures and attitudes, it is less concerned with alternatives and more concerned with a deeper understanding of security. Some may reject critical theory for advancing an unsatisfying and incomplete methodology that may not be workable and policy-oriented. However, rejection and rethinking is the first step towards any structural changes. There is no point in advancing a completely alternative framework of security without first changing mindsets by questioning the very nature of security. Furthermore, the very exercise of criticism presents us with a more realistic picture of the world than the present ideology of security as presented by the state (and its elites). Even CSS theorists differ on how to construct alternative models of security, in order to provide for the ultimate goal of the CSS project: human emancipation. CSS scholars are divided into two distinct categories: wideners and deepeners. While wideners claim that the greatest threat to state survival is not military-based, but economic, social and environmental, deepeners focus on the question of whose security is threatened and whether the security project is better achieved with an individual or society-centered referent rather than the state (Krause 1996, 230). The two categories are not mutually-exclusive, and this paper will advance a concept of security that both widens and deepens the field of security studies. At the same time, it is impossible to achieve the end goal of human emancipation without questioning the existing oppressive power structures and institutions; hence, this paper will also take a poststructuralist outlook to the question of security and deconstruct the concept of the national security state, in addition to the flawed neo-realist notion of security. The [National] Security Dilemma Under the lens of critical theory, there are many problems with the current framework of national security. First, security is a paradox for the more we add to the national security agenda, the more we have to fear. As Barry Buzan (1991, 37) points out in People, States and Fear, the security paradox presents us with a cruel irony in that to be secure ultimately, would mean “being unable to escape.” Thus, to secure oneself, one would need to be trapped in a timeless state, for leaving this state would incur risks. The current neo-realist realization of national security is quite narrow and does not take into account threats to human welfare, health, social problems, and domestic sources of insecurity. However, in Security: A New Framework of Analysis, several CSS theorists put forward the case for widening the field of security studies and separating these into five different sectors under state control: military, politics, environment, society and economy (Buzan, De Wilde and Waever 1998, 21-23). But, since these wideners leave the referent object of security as the state, widening the field of security studies becomes even more troubling because it risks more state control over our lives, the militarization of social issues such as drugs and crime, which would further legitimize and justify state violence, leaving us all the more insecure. Accordingly, it becomes clear that a mere re- definition of “security” away from its current neo-realist framework does not solve the security dilemma if the referent object of security is left unchanged. This goes to prove that it is the state as the referent object that requires questioning in terms of its supposed provision of security rather than the problems with widening the field of security. Without a state-centric concept of security, there would be no national security agenda left to widen, as our security concerns would be human-centered, hence, the paradox of security would dissipate. A second part of the security paradox is that security and insecurity are not binary opposites. On a micro-level, if security is the state of being secure, than insecurity should be the state of not being secure. However, what we do feel secure about is neither part of the national security agenda nor a conscious thought or feeling. The state of being secure is thus, not conceptualized as an absence of insecurity. On a policymaking level, Robert Lipschutz (1995, 27), Associate Professor of Politics at University of California, Santa Cruz, notes in On Security that our desire to achieve security through the acquisition of arms and a national missile “defense” system, serves to insecure those whom we label and treat as threats. This encourages the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and offensive posturing by those we wish to secure ourselves against, causing us to feel more insecure as the end result of our search for security. More recently, when George W. Bush included North Korea in his illogical “Axis of Evil” and named it as a threat to the United States, the peripheral state had no nuclear capability and would never have thought to use the threat of weapons of mass destruction to blackmail Western powers into giving aid. However, alarmed at the thought of being the next Afghanistan or Iraq, North Korea retaliated within a year by revealing its nuclear arsenal. The United States watched helplessly as one more previously benign nation became a real security problem. As a consequence, imagined enemies become real threats due to the ongoing threat construction by the state, and this poses the security dilemma of creating self-fulfilling prophecies in the current framework of security. Our notion of security is what the state says it is, rather than what we feel it is. Yet, this entrenched view of security is epistemologically flawed, which is our second dilemma; meaning that our knowledge of security as it is defined is based in certain realist assumptions that do not hold up under scrutiny. Our perception of what and from whom we need to be secured is not based on the actual threats that exist, but on the threats that we are told to perceive by the state. Thus, terrorists, drugs, illegal immigrants, “Third World” dictators, rogue states, blacks, non-Christians, and the Other, are considered as threats to the national security apparatus, and consequently, as threats to the individual American. This state construction of threats pervades our minds, causing a trickle-down effect that encourages a culture of fear, where the only limit to the coming danger is our imagination. Lipschutz (2000, 44-45) concludes in After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, “the national security state is brought down to the level of the household, and each one arms itself against the security dilemma posed by its neighbor across the hedge of fence.” Lipschutz seems to be saying that it is national security that eventually encourages the creation of a dichotomy between the self and the Other in our everyday lives. Indeed, it is the discourse of security by the rulers and elites, which creates and sustains our bipolar mindset of the world. A final dilemma presented by the current security framework is that security is ontologically unstable, unable to exist on its own, requiring the creation of certain conditions and categories, specifically, the creation of the Other. James Der Derian (1995, 25), Associate Professor of Political Science at U Mass (Amherst), notes in On Security that we are taught to consider security as “an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread belief in it.” Yet, national security is a highly unstable concept and changes over time, with the construction of new threats and enemies. Due to its unstable nature, security can then, be considered as a constant fluid that is constructed and re- defined by the discourse of the state and security elites. Ole Waever, a senior researcher at the Center for Peace and Conflict Research, contends that the very act of uttering “security” places it on the security agenda, thereby giving the state and its elite, power over the issue. In On Security, he notes that “in naming a certain development a security problem, the state can claim a special right, one that in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites” (1995, 55). This process is termed as “securitization,” which simply means treating an event or issue as a problem of national security rather than first questioning whether it should even be treated as a security issue. Such an act serves the interests of the state and its elites, starting with security discourse by the state, which constructs and perpetuates state identity and existence. Purpose(s) of Securitization: (1) Identity Construction and the Preservation of the State Identity is not a stable and stationary concept; it is constantly redefined and reconstructed to meet new challenges and adapt to new events. It would be easier to draw a parallel between gender identity and state identity to exemplify this concept. Contrary to mainstream thought, gender identity is socially constructed and keeps changing throughout our lives. Comparably, the identity of the state is also in a constant state of flux. The state and its elites are involved in identity work when they place or take things off the national security agenda. And similarly to gender identity, which requires the presence of difference (masculine and feminine) in order for gender to have any meaning, the state requires the existence of the Other to build an identity for the self. This identity is a performative constitution, taking the shape of security discourse, and thus, the “constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from and ‘outside,’ a ‘self’ from an ‘other,’ a ‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign’ (Campbell 1998, 9). The state moves to eliminate the Other and claim sovereignty over the outside and the foreign. In doing so, the state gains power and control over foreign policy, and international relations becomes a field concerned with building boundaries instead of bridges. However, since the identity of the state is fluid, boundaries do change over time though the performative constitution of state identity, which occurs through security discourse. This positional identity construction will be examined in terms of the Cold War and Post-Cold War era, but it is important to note that the discourse of fear and danger, in order to construct state identity, is not new to the modern nation-state. David Campbell (1998, 49), Professor of International Politics at University of Newcastle in England, suggests in Writing Security that the discourse of danger by the state is as old as Christendom for “thinking that Western civilization was besieged by a horde of enemies (Turks, Jews, heretics, witches), the church saw the devil everywhere and encouraged guilt to such an extent that a culture of anxiety ensured.” Today, Turks, Jews, heretics and witches have simply been replaced with rogue nations, “Arab terrorists,” communists, and “Third World” dictators through security discourse. After the fall of Christendom, danger has become the new God of Western civilization, and according to Campbell (1998, 48), the discourse of threat construction provides a “new theology of truth...about who and what we are by highlighting who or what ‘we’ are not, and what ‘we’ have to fear.” This demonstrates the inherent unstable nature of security as defined by the national security state, and the never-ending construction of identity through the otherization of difference. Instead of celebrating our different identities and bridging the gaps present in international relations, the national security state has drawn boundaries by constructing an identity in opposition to the Other. The Cold War serves as the classic example of statist identity construction through the creation of the Other, which created more insecurity than security for the entire world. After the fall of Hitler and the Axis powers, the United States emerged as a superpower, along with the Soviet Union, which had been a key ally in the war. Due to the neo-realist obsession with an ordered world operating under the assumption that states exist in an anarchic system, the United States formulated an identity of the self that was opposed to disorder and incivility. Out of the Cold War discourse of the Other came the national security state, which was defined by the National Security Act of 1947 (Der Derian 1992, 76), a measure that Truman regretted signing by the time he left office. This national security state found an enemy in the Soviet Union, and created the Other in order to stabilize the self and guarantee its existence. In NSC-68, the United States admitted that even without the threat of Soviet communism, it would still pursue policies designed to shape the world in a more orderly manner (Campbell 1998, 30-31), probably referring to a more capitalist economic order. The Cold War that ensued between the two superpowers became coded as a struggle between good and evil, civilized and barbaric, freedom-loving and totalitarian. Suddenly, the threat of communism was equated to the ruthless and fascist Nazi regime, and communism was “un-American,” as demonstrated by the oppressive activities of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). The search for national security created insecurity for a large number of Americans who were labeled as communists and Soviet-sympathizers, blacklisted and lost their jobs. The identity construction by the American statecraft in opposition to Soviet communism did serve the interests of the elite. Issues such as employment, childcare, women’s rights, universal healthcare, and equal wages were characterized as evil and foreign by being associated with communism and the Soviet Union (Campbell 1998, 140). These domestic issues caused vast human insecurity in the United States, and the Cold War search for security caused insecurity throughout the entire world. It is important to note that the Soviet Union was never a military threat to the United States. This is not to say that the USSR lacked military capability, but that its ability to cause severe damage to the United States was not recognized (and encouraged) until it was construed as the Other. To secure the self from the threat of the Other, the two superpowers engaged in a massive arms buildup, which almost resulted in nuclear annihilation during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Furthermore, they fought proxy wars in underdeveloped countries, destroying millions of lives and infrastructure. The end result of this face-off was a vast amount of human insecurity, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and our existing bipolar mindset of the world. Even today, what constitutes of American is unclear; however, what unites Americans is the threat of what is defined as “un-American” by the national security apparatus. In the Post-September 11 era, identity construction by the American state in terms of us vs. them discourse continues to pervade our consciousness. The threat of a nuclear winter never did materialize, but it seems to have deep frozen the minds of our policymakers, and no amount of thawing makes any difference. George W. Bush is so infected with the “Cold War of the mind” that he keeps coughing up redundant phrases like “they hate freedom,” and “either you are with us or you are with the terrorists," which usually happens every time he stumbles and cannot find anything else in his frozen brain. In a press release after the ‘terrorist’ attack in Bali, Bush stated that “those of us who love freedom must work together to do everything we can to disrupt, deny and bring to justice these people who have no soul, no conscience, people that hate freedom” (U.S. Department of State 2002, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs). Who in their right mind hates freedom?! Then, in his State of the Union address this year, Bush maintained that “the United States has no right, no desire, and no intention to impose our form of government on anyone else. That is one of the main differences between us and our enemies” (U.S. Department of State 2005, Democracy). In all of these cases, the enemy is ill-defined and unknown, simply functioning as an opposition against whom the American state can construct an identity. Additionally, the enemy or the Other is outside the border, and not within, as is represented by “we have to face terrorists abroad so we do not have to fight them here at home.” It is preposterous to think that Americans cannot be terrorists or engage in terrorism, and yet the state ensures us that “we” are peace- loving, free and civil while “they” are constructed as uncivilized, soulless, inhumane, barbaric and oppressive. While functioning as identity construction for the state, this discourse of security also legitimizes state violence in favor of elitist interests. (2) National Security is an Elite Tool National security serves as a function of elite security rather than human security. We have already discussed Waever’s theory on how elites securitize an event or issue through speech acts, and as a result, gain power and resources over an issue. This (national security) speech act also works to create insecurity for the human population. The apartheid regime in South Africa is a classic example of how national security is structured around elite security, while making the majority of the South African population and neighboring nations feel insecure. During the Cold War, national security for the apartheid regime was tied to a portrayal of South Africa as a threatened and unstable state, requiring the constant support of Western powers (Booth and Vale 1997, 335), including the acquisition of nuclear arms from the United States. The black liberation movement in South Africa was characterized as Communist, although the only “ideology” that the movement adhered to was human rights and freedom. The minority white elites simply used the fear of communism to build up a military state and wage war against the majority African population, who were excluded from power. The neighboring states saw South Africa as an all too powerful state with offensive posturing, and thus the security of the apartheid regime translated into insecurity for the surrounding states and the majority of the South African population. In the United States, the securitization of energy policy and the subsequent occupation of Middle East countries has served elite interests while making us all the more insecure. The invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan demonstrates how the national security state works for the economic gain and security of power elites. There was no humane reason to go to war with Afghanistan, but post 9-11, the national security state build up the case for invading and colonizing the country. Not even a single terrorist involved in the September 11 attacks was from Afghanistan. In fact, the United States had helped to prop up the Taliban regime and Osama bin Laden by training and giving them arms in the 1970s to fight against the USSR. In doing so, the United States placed an authoritarian government in power, which was bad news for most Afghans, and especially women. In the weeks leading up to the war, we heard a lot of PR from the White House on the inhumane treatment of women in Afghanistan, including how women were “banned from working, flogged for wearing makeup, even executed for invented sins” (Flanders 2001, 36). Here is another case in point of positional identity construction by the national security state: we uphold women’s rights everywhere and they oppress their own women; it is what they do. The images of helpless and needy women in burkhas and hijabs required that the chauvinistic and patriarchal, (in addition to ethnocentric), security state liberate them from the oppressive conditions. Almost overnight, the anti-abortion and anti-sexual rights George Bush becomes a feminist and makes the case for war by touting the oppression of women by the Taliban. In this case, the outright lie helps in winning overwhelming support for a war that is really being waged for ulterior elitist motives. The war against Afghanistan had everything to do with Big Oil and America’s geopolitical interest in dominating the oil-rich regions of Central Asia and the Middle- East, having very little to do with any security threat posed by the Taliban or Saddam Hussein. Thus, along with Afghanistan, President Bush had a massive number of troops deployed in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia within a few weeks of 9-11, all of which have rich oil reserves worth up to an estimated $4 trillion (Klevemen 2004, 11). This made oil companies such as Unocal happy as they had been fruitlessly trying for years to reach an agreement with the Taliban on building an oil pipeline through Afghanistan. Then, within the first few months of overthrowing the Taliban, President Karzai of Afghanistan, a former Unocal advisor, agreed to the long-planned building of a $3.2 billion oil pipeline running from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan, all the way into the Indian Ocean (Klevemen 2004, 11). Therefore, while Americans are still paying almost $3 at the pump and the number of American soldiers dead is increasing steadily, Big Oil is getting ready to make billions at the expense of human security. The “war against terror” has created massive insecurity for people in the Middle- East and all parts of the world. Al Qaeda networks have proliferated to dozens more countries. While people and soldiers in the thousands are losing their lives in this supposed “war on terror,” millions in the United States are terrorized by the expansion of the national security state. The Bill of Rights has become a victim of state terrorism, as the American statecraft locks up people for an indefinite period without due process of law. The state has been given the green light to perform strip-searches at our ports of entry, and here, race has become a proxy for criminality. Suppression of information and academic freedom, in addition to unauthorized wiretaps has become the law of the land. One would think that the insecurity caused to the American people and to the state apparatus through the blowbacks of hegemony, characterized by 9-11, would de- legitimize the state. Paradoxically, it is the creation of insecurity that stabilizes the state and guarantees its existence. Here, we find the greatest paradox of the state as the provider of security. The tate has always been considered as the primary provider of security and this has been the basis of its existence. However, if the state succeeds in achieving security, it would cease to exist. Hence, Campbell (1998; 13) concludes that “the constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a state’s identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility.” Instead of hurting the state or its legitimacy as we might think by default, actual threats and the discourse of danger from the outside help to propel the state and safeguard its existence. Thus, paradoxically, insecurity secures the state! September 11 serves as the perfect example of a state that was struck with a terrible atrocity from outside, and yet, instead of disintegrating, the state gained more power and control over our lives. Indeed, the leader of the most powerful nation of the world would never have won re-election (or rather, be elected for the first time) without the help of this catastrophic event. However, while the state is being secured, it is human security that is sacrificed. In the final analysis then, since national security is diametrically opposed to human security, the state must be dislodged as the primary referent object of security. Deconstructing the [National Security] State Throughout this paper, we have seen cases of how national security is an antonym for human security. With this essential realization, Booth (2005, 33) gives three reasons for why the state should not be the referent object of security: “states are unreliable as primary referents because while some are in the business of security some are not; even those which are producers of security represent the mans and not the ends; and states are too diverse in their character to serve as the basis for a comprehensive theory of security.” Additionally, the cases of South Africa and Afghanistan prove how the national ecurity state is merely an elite tool, which causes human insecurity at home and abroad. The state treats security as a problem that comes from the outside, rather than as a problem that can arise from domestic issues. The end result of state-centric security is that humans are alienated from discussions about their own security and welfare. The most compelling reason is provided by Hayward Akler (2005, 191) in Critical Security Studies and World Politics, in which he states that “economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease provide more serious threats to the well-being of individuals and the interest of nations.” Thus, to millions of people, it is not the existence of the Other across the border that poses a security problem, but their own state that is a threat to security. The question that arises next is how to put critical theory into practice and deconstruct the national security state. Critical theory does not offer simple one-shot solutions to the problems created by the neo-realist state and elitist conception of security. To give simple answers would be a performative contradiction, especially after criticizing realism for being intellectually rigid for believing in objective truth. In other words, there are no alternatives; just alternative modes of understanding. However, using the poststructuralist Foucaultian analysis that discourse is power, we can move towards deconstructing the power of the state and elites to securitize using their own tool: discourse. The elites who control the meaning of security and define it in terms that are appropriate to their interests hold tremendous power in the national security state. As Foucault astutely observed, “the exercise of power is always deeply entwined with the production of knowledge and discourse” (Dalby 1998, 4). For too long, language has been used against us to create our reality, thereby obfuscating our lens of the world, depriving us from an objective search for truth and knowledge. The history of colonized people shows how the construction of language defined and justified their oppressed status. In a way, we are colonized through discursive practices and subjected to the reality that the state wants us to see. However, definitions belong to the definer, and it is high time that we questioned and defined our own reality. Thus, citizen action is critical to questioning and deconstructing the national security state and taking away its power to define our security. In On Security, Pearl Alice Marsh (1995, 126) advances the idea of a grassroots statecraft that is defined as “challenging foreign policy of government through contending discursive and speech acts.” This calls for pitting the values of civil society against the state establishment and challenging the American statecraft’s freedom to cast issues and events in a security or militarized framework. The United States has not always been a national security state and neither does it have to maintain that hegemonic and oppressive status in order to exist. It is critical to remember that fundamental changes in our institutions and structures of power do not occur from the top; they originate from the bottom. History is case in point. Citizen action was critical to ending the Red Scare and the Vietnam War, as the American people realized the ludicrousness of framing Vietnam as a security issue, which led to the fall of the Second New Deal, the deaths of thousands of American soldiers and a financial cost that we are still shouldering. In the end, what they need to be secured from and how, is a question best left up to individual Americans and subsequently, civil society. Thus, grassroots citizen action performatively makes individuals the referent subject of security as people would call for the demilitarization and desecuritization of issues that are contrary and irrelevant to human security. There is hope for the future and practical application of critical theory in international relations. As Robert Lipschutz (2000, 61) concludes in After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, “it was the existence of the Other across the border that gave national security its power and authority; it is the disappearance of the border that has vanquished that power.” Britain, France and Germany set aside their historical enmities and became part of a European community, which has formed a new collective identity and security across borders. Cold War rivals that almost annihilated the world are now friends in the “war against terror.” The apartheid regime in South Africa did collapse eventually. In the past two years, India and Pakistan have been moving towards a more peaceful future that also includes fighting the “war against terror” together. While nation-states that were previously hostile to each other have united to be hostile towards other states, it is not overly idealist to suggest that with each new friendship and alliance, there is one less foe and one less Other. The world is not stable and stagnant, existing in an anarchic, nasty and brutish framework in which states have to endlessly bargain for their self-interest, as realists would like us to believe. On the contrary, international relations and the boundaries constructed by the state are subject to change and ever-transitioning, which presents a compelling case for critical theory as a more realistic framework through which we can view international relations. Therefore, our ultimate search for security does not lie in securing the state from the threat of the enemy across the border, but in removing the state as the referent object of security and moving towards human emancipation.

### Vote neg to refrain from the basic terms of reference – only critique solves

Graeme Cheeseman, Snr. Lecturer @ New South Wales, and Robert Bruce, ‘96 (Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)KENTUCKY

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. I IT challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she (THEY ARE) is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates , or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

1. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded that the observed global warming since the mid-20th century was very likely to have been caused by rising anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations (IPCC 2007a). Despite the media hype of the so-called “climate gate” (caused by the leak of the emails stolen from the Climate Research Unit at the British University of East Anglia), none of the basic scientific facts concerning climate change was challenged. See the open letter by 255 leading scientists on the issue (Guardian 2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)